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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE COURT'S JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is properly in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j),
and Utah R. App. Proc. 3 and 4.

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Appellate Court is to review the trial court's grant of summary judgment for
correctness, and view all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. M&S
Cox Investments, LLC v. Provo City Corp., 2007 UT App 315 1J 19; Kilpatrick v. Wiley,
909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah Ct. App. 1996.). The Appellate Court does not defer to the
trial court's conclusion that the facts are undisputed nor its legal conclusions supported
by those facts. M&S Cox Investments, 2007 UT App 315 ^ 19; Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at
1289. Summary judgment is only appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions, together with affidavits, show there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert denied 789 P.2d
33 (Utah 1990) {citing Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Assocs., 635 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah
\9%\)){emphasis added.)
The appellate court may affirm the trial court's judgment on any ground; even one
not relied upon by the trial court, as long as the rationale for affirming that decision is
supported by the record. Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Utah 2002); White v.
Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d. 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994.) Summary disposition of lawsuits is a
valuable and necessary tool in our judicial system that assists in the efficient and timely
resolution of legal disputes and granting summary judgment saves the parties and the
court the time and expense trial. Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 824.

2

STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21.5 sets out the duties of a trustee, which include the
preparation and execution of the cancellation of a notice of default.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 sets out the procedure and requirements for allowing a
trustor to reinstate a delinquent loan after the trustee has recorded a notice of default, and
states that once a trustor has cured the default, the trustee may record a cancellation of the
notice of default.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On January 24, 2001 Alan J. Squires entered into a Note and first position

Deed of Trust with IndyMac Bank, FSB {hereinafter "IndyMac" and "Indymac Deed of
Trust") for a loan on property located at 2350 West Red Pine Court, Park City, UT 84098
{hereinafter "the Property"). Indymac subsequently assigned its interest to Deutsche
Bank National Trust Company {hereinafter "Deutsche"), although Indymac remained the
loan servicer. (R. at 1-5.)
2.

First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc. {hereinafter "FSWT") was

named trustee of the Indymac Deed of Trust. (R. at 4.)
3.

Alan J. Squires defaulted under the terms of the loan and FSWT recorded a

Notice of Default on October 8, 2003. (R. at 4); See, ADDENDUM Exhibit A Notice of
Default.
4.

Unknown to FSWT, on or about July 28, 2004, Deutsche and RJW Media,

Inc. {hereinafter "RJW") entered into a Note Purchase and Sale Agreement wherein RJW
purchased the indebtedness of Squires to Deutsche. (R. at 4; R. at 434); See,
ADDENDUM Exhibit B Deposition Transcript of Nancy Blanco at 28:4-25, 29: 1-5.
5.

Unknown to FSWT, on July 28, 2004 Deutsche transferred its beneficial

interest in the IndyMac Trust Deed to RJW by assignment {hereinafter "the
Assignment".) (R. at 5; R. at 434; See, Addendum B at 28:4-25, 29: 1-5); See,
ADDENDUM Exhibit C the Assignment.
6.

The Summit County Recorder recorded the Assignment on August 9, 2004.

(R. at 5; See, Addendum C.)
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7.

RJW's attorneys Wrona & Parrish requested the recording of the

Assignment. (R. at 323; R. at 410); See, ADDENDUM Exhibit D Deposition Transcript
of Blake S. Parrish at Parrish Dep. at 58:24-25; 59.
8.

RJW's counsel delivered the assignment to the office of the Summit

County Recorder for recording. (R. at 323; R. at 410.)
9.

The Summit County Recorder mailed the original recorded assignment to

RJW's attorneys Wrona & Parrish. (R. at 254, Middlemas Aff., ffi[ 3-4; R. at 324); See,
ADDENDUM Exhibit E Correspondence and Records of Summit County Recorder,
Alan Spriggs.
10.

FSWT did not receive the original recorded Assignment from Summit

County. (R. at 324; R. at 254, Middlemas Aff., ffi[ 3-4 & Ex. A-B; See, Addendum B at
28: 4-25, 29: 1-5; see also, Addendum E.)
11.

RJW did not mail a copy of the Assignment to FSWT at the time it was

recorded, and neither RJW nor its counsel called or communicated with FSWT to make
them aware of the July 28, 2004 Assignment after it was recorded, until at least
November 16, 2004. (R. at 254, Middlemas Aff., ffl| 3-4 & Ex. A-B; R. at 325; R. at 411;
See, Addendum Bat 21:4-25; 22:1-17, 28:4-25, 29:1-5, 39:1-12, 41:2-5, 49: 1-8; see also
Addendum D at 40: 24-25, 41:1-18, 62:2-5, 69:2-13); See also ADDENDUM Exhibit F
Plf.'s Resp. to Def. FSWT's Req. for Admis. at 2-3.
12.

Indymac did not tell FSWT about the Assignment. (R. at 324; See,

Addendum Bat 39:1-12.)
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13.

On or about September 22, 2004, Deutsche's servicer Indymac, through its

foreclosure attorneys, instructed FSWT to record a cancellation of the October 8, 2003
Notice of Default. (R. at 324; R. at 410; See, Addendum B. at 32:16-20, 33:8-17.)
14.

On or about September 22, 2004, FSWT recorded the Cancellation of

Notice of Default (hereinafter "the Cancellation"). (R. at 324; R. at 410); See,
ADDENDUM Exhibit G Cancellation of Notice of Default.
15.

FSWT was unaware of the Assignment or the change of beneficiaries when

it recorded the Cancellation. (R. at 324; See, Addendum B at 39:1-12.)
16.

FSWT did not obtain a title report update before recording the Cancellation

because it is not an industry standard to do so. (R. at 312, Smith Aff, \ 9; R. at 315,
Davis Aff. \ 5; R. at 324; R. at 410; See, Addendum B at 33:20-25, 34:1-13, 46:25, 47:17.)
17.

It is not the custom or practice for a trustee to obtain a title report before

recording a Cancellation of Notice of Default or to question the authority of the purported
beneficiary. (R. at 312, Smith Aff., fflj 8-9; R. at 315, Davis Aff., ffij 4-5; R. at 324; R. at
410.)
18.

On or about October 28, 2004, S. Blake Parrish {hereinafter "Parrish"),

RJW's former attorney, became successor trustee to the IndyMac Trust Deed, and FSWT
was removed as trustee. (R. at 325; R. at 410.)
19.

RJW proceeded with non-judicial foreclosure of the IndyMac Trust Deed,

culminating in a trustee's sale of the Property held on December 13, 2004. RJW did not
update its title search before the sale, as is customary in the title and foreclosure industry,
6

and did not know about the Cancellation. (R. at. 325; R. at 411; R. at 313, Smith Aff, f
11; R. at 315, Davis Aff., % 6.)
20.

Months after the sale, defendant and junior lien holder The CIT Group

(hereinafter "CIT"), recorded its own Notice of Default to foreclose its junior lien,
believing that the trustee's sale was void because of the Cancellation. (R. at 1-18.)
21.

RJW also became aware of the Cancellation, but instead of recording a new

Notice of Default, RJW filed suit against CIT and FSWT to stop CIT's foreclosure sale,
have RJW's trustee's sale declared valid, and obtain damages against CIT and FSWT.
(R. at 1-18; R. at 326; R. at 411-412.)
22.

RJW filed its Complaint on July 20, 2005, and pled causes of action for

Slander of Title, Injunctive Relief, and Breach of Duty against FSWT. (R. at 1-18.)
23.

RJW did not make a jury demand. (R. at 1-18.)

24.

RJW subsequently stipulated to a dismissal of its actions against FSWT

for Slander of Title and Injunctive Relief, leaving only the cause of action for Breach of
Duty. (R. at 52.)
25.

During the discovery phase, RJW took the deposition of FSWT employee

Nancy Blanco. See, Addendum B. FSWT took the deposition of RJW's attorney and
substitute trustee Blake S. Parrish. See, Addendum D.
26.

After discovery was complete, the parties filed cross-motions for summary

judgment. (R. at 230-232; R. at 348-349.)
27.

In support of FSWT's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, FSWT

submitted the affidavits of foreclosure attorneys Kathy A. Davis and Melven E. Smith
7

{hereinafter collectively wCthe Affidavits") to provide standard-in-industry evidence. (R. at
311-316.)
28.

FSWT submitted evidence of the practice and procedure of the Summit

County Recorder. (R. at 253-254; Middlemas Aff., Th 3-4 & Ex. A-B; See, Addendum
E.) The correspondence and records of the Summit County Recorder stated that it was its
practice to return a recorded document to the party who had requested the recording
regardless of the instructions on the face of the document. See, Addendum E.
Consequently, the Assignment was mailed to the office of RJW's attorneys and not to
FSWT. (R. at 254, Middlemas Aff, ffi| 3-4 & Ex. A-B; R. at 324.)
29.

RJW did not provide counter-affidavits to dispute the Affidavits submitted

by FSWT in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 409-416; R. at 433.)
30.

On September 18, 2006, the trial court heard oral argument of the parties

concerning their respective motions for summary judgment. (R. at 713); See,
ADDENDUM Exhibit H Transcript of September 18, 2006 Oral Arguments on Motion
for Summary Judgment - Allocation of Fees.
32.

On September 22, 2006, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor

of FSWT. (R. at 533); See, ADDENDUM Exhibit I September 22, 2006 Ruling and
Order.

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
RJW attacks the sufficiency and validity of the Affidavits for the first time on
appeal, but RJW failed to preserve an issue concerning the Affidavits for appeal. The
Utah Supreme Court forbids a party who failed to raise objections to formal or
evidentiary defects in an affidavit supporting a motion for summary judgment before the
trial court from raising those objections on appeal. RJW did not object to the sufficiency
of the Affidavits in its various memoranda. Its brief remarks regarding the existence of
the Affidavits in oral argument were not sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal
because RJW did not timely object, raise a specific objection, or cite authority or
evidence in support of its objection.
RJW also failed to raise an objection to the use of the testimony of Kathy A. Davis
and Melven E. Smith without designating them as experts, or providing expert reports. At
no time did RJW address the issue of the use of experts or lay witnesses for standard-inindustry evidence other than in passing in oral argument. Again, those remarks were
insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal because RJW did not timely object to the use
of the testimony, raise a specific objection, or cite authority or evidence in support of its
objection.
Summary judgment was appropriately granted to FSWT because although the law
did not fix the standard of care, it was established factually by uncontroverted standardof-industry evidence. Because RJW failed to present counter-affidavits in opposition to
those submitted by FSWT, which showed that FSWT acted reasonably within the bounds
9

of industry custom and standards, the trial court reached the reasonable conclusion that
FS WT did not breach its duty as a matter of law. Utah law emphasizes the need for
standard-of-industry evidence in negligence cases where a trade or profession is
concerned.
Standard-of-industry evidence was particularly important here to understand why
FSWT recorded the Cancellation and that its actions did not constitute a breach of duty.
The undisputed evidence supported FSWT's contentions that it acted reasonably when it
followed Indymac's instructions to record the Cancellation without questioning
Indymac's authority, where it had no notice from either Indymac or RJW that RJW was
the new beneficiary.
RJW argues that the law did not fix the standard of care, but it also argues in the
alternative that the standard of care was established by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21.5 and
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31, and case law cited. Neither Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21.5 nor
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 direct a trustee to seek the express permission of the
beneficiary or to verify that a loan has or has not been reinstated before recording a
cancellation of notice of default, nor do they provide a penalty for failure under the
statute. Utah Code § 57-1-31 represents only one of several reasons to cancel a notice of
default, and the policy behind the statute allows beneficiaries and trustees the flexibility
to cancel notices of default where required, even when the default has not been cured.
Even if FSWT had a duty to obtain RJW's authorization under Utah Code Ann. §
57-1-31 before recording the Cancellation, FSWT could not reasonably have obtained
RJW's permission when it did not know that RJW existed because neither Indymac nor
10

RJW had notified FSWT of the Assignment. Because RJW failed to establish the
standard of care and establish facts to show that FSWT breached its duty, summary
judgment was appropriate because RJW failed to meet its burden of proof and establish
all elements of its cause of action.
Even if an objection to the Affidavits or the use of the affiants' testimony had been
preserved for appeal, the Affidavits were sufficient to provide the trial court with valid
standard-of-industry evidence. Utah law emphasizes the need for standard-of-industry
evidence to determine the standard of care, but does not require that experts testify to
establish the standard of care. FSWT did not designate Melven E. Smith and Kathy A.
Davis as experts because they did not state opinions and because expert testimony was
not required to establish the standard of care. Rather, FSWT only needed to present the
testimony of qualified witnesses who worked in the same trade or profession, which
testimony was presented and was undisputed. Even if the court believed that the
Affidavits constituted opinion, that opinion was allowable under Utah R. Evid. 701.
Finally, RJW cannot argue that it was prejudiced by the use of the Affidavits. As
the plaintiff, RJW could have produced its own expert testimony or invoked Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(f). It would be a waste of judicial resources to remand this matter for further
proceedings, especially where the evidence presented to the trial court was
uncontro verted.
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ARGUMENT
A.

RJW failed to raise the issue of the sufficiency of FSWT's affidavits to
the trial court and cannot raise those issues for the first time on appeal.

RJW failed to preserve the issue of the sufficiency or validity of the Affidavits for
appeal. (Appellant's Br. at 27-29.) An appellant may not raise issues or objections for
the first time on appeal unless the appellant also argues plain error or exceptional
circumstances, and articulates appropriate justification for failing to preserve an issue for
appeal. State of Utah v. Winfield, 128P.3d 1171, 1177 (Utah 2006) (quoting State of
Utah v. Pinder, 114 P.3d 551, 561 (Utah 2005)); West v. Case, 142 P.3d 576, 579 (Utah
Ct. App. 2006). RJW has argued that the trial court committed legal error, not plain
error, and it has not articulated why it failed to preserve the issue of the sufficiency of the
Affidavits for appeal, such as exceptional circumstances. (Appellant's Br. at 2-3.)
The Utah Supreme Court forbids a party from challenging an affidavit on appeal
where it failed to move to strike or otherwise object to that affidavit before the trial court:
"Formal or evidentiary defects in an affidavit in support or opposition to a motion for
summary judgment are waived in the absence of a motion to strike or other objection."
Pinetree Assoc, v. Ephraim City, 67 P.3d 462, 465 (Utah 2003)(quoting D&L Supply v.
Saurinl 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989); Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah
1985); Fox v. Allstate Ins. Co., 453 P.2d 701 (Utah 1969). Under Ephraim City RJW
must have either made a motion to strike or objected to the sufficiency of the Affidavits
in a manner that would have allowed the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue,
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and to correct the error asserted. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat Inc., 99 P.3d 801, 813
(Utah 2004); West 142 P.2d at 579; Ephraim City, 67 P.3d at 466.
RJW did not provide meaningful notice of the issue to the trial court. In order for
the trial court to have meaningful notice of an issue and to have the opportunity to correct
an asserted error, the issue: 1) must be raised in a timely fashion, 2) must be specifically
raised, and 3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority. 438 Main Street, 99 P.3d at 813 (citing Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v.
Peebles, 48 P.3d 968 (Utah 2002)). RJW did not file a motion to strike, therefore in order
to preserve an issue as to the Affidavits it must have objected in a manner that satisfies
the three elements articulated in 438 Main Street.
RJW did not file or raise a formal objection to the Affidavits, nor did it move to
strike the Affidavits. Instead, RJW simply did not respond to the Affidavits. There is no
mention of the Affidavits in either RJW's Reply Memorandum Supporting RJW's
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 397-401), or in its Memorandum Opposing
FSWT's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 409-416.)
While RJW did not mention the Affidavits in its various memoranda, it briefly
mentioned the Affidavits at the September 18, 2006, oral arguments. In response to
FSWT's arguments RJW's attorney Joseph Wrona stated:
"With regard to First Southwestern Title, seems to me their—their arguments
today are two fold. They challenged the breach and they challenged damages. First
Southwest Title attempts to invoke an industry standard and they make the
argument, 'Look, we have demonstrated an industry standard," and it then
becomes incumbent on RJW Media to sort of present a counter-industry standard,
and then we're going to have a battle of experts at trial, I guess. And there are
certain types of cases where we have battles of experts about, you know, for
13

instance, whether malpractice occurs. But an affidavit of industry standard cannot
overcome a legal duty or a statutorily imposed duty. When the law say you must
do x, you must do y, you must do z, an affidavit from somebody saying c We don't
do that; we've never really done that', that does not create a reasonable dispute of
fact. So, if in fact we have a clearly articulated legal standard, frankly, you know,
a hundred affidavits from a hundred experts cannot overcome that legal duty."
(R. at 713, at 32:19-25, 33: 1-11; See, Addendum H.)
RJW's comments failed to preserve an issue for appeal. 438 Main Street, 99 P.3d
at 813. First, the issue was not raised in a timely manner. RJW only mentioned the
Affidavits at oral argument, and at no time made mention of the Affidavits in its written
memoranda. Second, RJW did not specifically raise an objection to the sufficiency of the
Affidavits. Clearly, RJW does not agree with the effect of the contents of the Affidavits,
but RJW did not object to any formal or evidentiary defect in the Affidavits. Third, RJW
did not cite any legal authority or evidence in support of an objection to any formal or
evidentiary defect in the Affidavits.
RJW was under an evidentiary burden to produce counter-affidavits. Smith v.
Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 70 P.3d 904, 915 (Utah 2003). By failing to
produce counter-affidavits to dispute the facts presented, the trial court had no choice but
deem the standard-of-industry evidence undisputed. Because the trial court was left with
no genuine issue of material fact, like the trial court in Ephraim City, the trial court here
was justified in relying upon the uncontroverted Affidavits and it did not err in granting
summary judgment to FSWT.
B.

RJW failed to preserve the issue of experts, expert designation, or the
use of the testimony of Kathy A, Davis and Melven E. Smith for appeal.
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RJW also failed to raise an objection to the use of the testimony of Kathy A. Davis
and Melven E. Smith without designating them as experts, or providing expert reports.
Once again, a party may not raise an issue or make an objection for the first time on
appeal, (Appellant's Br. at 27-29), and an issue is only preserved for appeal if presented
to the trial court in a manner that allows the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue,
West, 142P.3dat579.
RJW did not meet the elements necessary to preserve an issue concerning
"experts" for appeal. 438 Main Street 99 P.3d at 813. At no time did RJW address the
issue of expert testimony other than in passing at the September 18, 2006 oral argument.
RJW's attorney acknowledged that FSWT expected RJW to produce counter-affidavits
and expressed concern over a potential "battle of experts." (R. at 713, at 32:21-25; See,
Addendum H.) RJW never objected to FSWT's non-designation of Kathy A. Davis and
Melven E. Smith or the use of their testimony, and did not provide any authority or
evidence in support of an objection.
C.

The standard of care was established factually and under the
undisputed facts FSWT did not breach its duty as a matter of law.

Summary judgment was appropriately granted to FSWT because the standard of
care was established factually by uncontroverted standard-of-industry of evidence. The
fact finder reasonably concluded that FSWT did not breach its duty and was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (R. at 533.) Summary judgment may be inappropriate
unless the standard of care is "fixed by law" and reasonable minds could reach but one
conclusion concerning a defendant's negligence under the circumstances. Wycalis, 780
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P.2d at 826. However, determining the standard of care is necessarily a factual question
and the standard of care may be determined where there is uncontroverted standard-ofindustry evidence, rather than in sole reliance on prior judicial decision or legislative
enactment. Id., 780 P.2d at 826. Once the standard of care is established factually, and
material facts are otherwise undisputed, reasonable minds may reach but one conclusion,
even where the standard of care was not "fixed by law."
Wycalis allows for an "as a matter of law" determination where there is
undisputed standard-in-industry evidence that establishes the applicable standard of care.
The Wycalis court held that it could not ".. .agree that the standard of care owed by
Guardian to Wycalis is 'fixed by law' or even conducive to an 'as a matter of law'
determination, especially in the absence of uncontro verted standard-of-the-industry
evidence." Id., 780 P.2d at 826 {emphasis added). The Wycalis court went on to say:
"The standard must be established factually.. .with an emphasis on standard-of-theindustry evidence." Id., 780 P.2d at 826 {emphasis added.) Based on that, the trial court
noted: "Wycalis therefore left the door open for the possibility that summary judgment
may be appropriate where a case involved 'uncontroverted standard-of-the-industry
evidence.'" (R. at 528.)
Here, the trial court ruled that in fact the applicable standard of care was not "fixed
by law", (R. at 526), but unlike the unsuccessful defendant in Wycalis, who failed to
present standard-of-industry evidence in support of its summary judgment motion, FSWT
had presented standard-of-industry evidence and had established the standard of care, (R.
at 311-316; R. at 528). A movant need only present testimony of witnesses who work in
16

the same industry or profession to establish the standard of care. Ortiz v. Geneva Rock
Products, Inc., 939 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) {citing Wessel v. Erikson
Landscaping, Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985.)) (Plaintiff established the standard of
care by uncontroverted evidence of two non-expert witnesses who worked in the same
profession.) Here, the trial court was justified in determining that the standard of care
had been sufficient established factually and that reasonable minds could not differ as to
FWST's reasonableness because the standard-in-industry evidence was undisputed. (R. at
528-533.)
RJW did not submit counter-affidavits. (R. at 433.) RJW had the burden of
producing counter-affidavits or equally meaningful evidence to oppose FSWT's Motion
for Summary Judgment and present disputed facts. Poteet v. White, 147 P.3d 439, 441
(Utah 2006); Johnson v. Hermes Assoc, 128 P.3d 1151, 1158 (Utah 2005); West, 142
P.3d at 578 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) {citing Smith, 70 P.3d at 915.))
In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court held ".. .when the moving party has presented
evidence sufficient to support a judgment in its favor, and the opposing party fails to
submit contrary evidence, a trial court is justified in concluding that no genuine issue of
fact is present or would be at trial." Smith, 70 P.3d at 915. When RJW failed to dispute
the standard-of-industry evidence either by counter-affidavit or equally meaningful
evidence, the trial court could only reach one reasonable conclusion as to FSWT's
negligence that FSWT acted reasonably and did not breach a duty as a matter of law.
RJW also failed to dispute specific facts supported by the Affidavits. In the
statement of facts supporting FSWT's Memorandum Opposing RJW's Motion for
17

Summary Judgment and Supporting FSWT's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,
FSWT stated:
u

15.

FSWT did not obtain a title report update before recording the Cancellation
because it is not an industry standard to do so. (Blanco Aff. at 33:20-25,
34:1-13, 46:25, 47:1-7; Smith Aff., f 9; Davis Aff. K 5.)" (R. at 324.)

In its opposing memorandum, RJW responded: "Undisputed." (R. at 410.) FSWT
continued:
"16.

It is not the custom or practice for a trustee to obtain a title report before
recording a Cancellation of Notice of Default or to question the authority of
the purported beneficiary. (Smith Aff., ffi[ 8-9; Davis Aff, ffi[ 4-5.)" (R. at
324.)

RJW responded: "Disputed, insofar as the Trust Deed Statute imposes a clear duty
upon a trustee to ensure that the debt underlying a trust deed has been paid and the
default cured prior to a trustee's issuance of a cancellation of notice of default." (R. at
410). RJW did not dispute undisputed fact number 16. The trial court commented on
RJW's response to fact statement number 16: "...RJW disputed the statement only to the
extent that the trust deed statute imposed a duty to ensure the default had been cured.
RJW apparently does not dispute that the custom or practice is not to question the
authority of the purported beneficiary...." (R. at 529.) RJW did not provide any
additional evidence to dispute the customs or practices of the title industry.
Just as in Wycalis and Ortiz, standard-of-industry evidence was particularly
important here to understand what motivated FSWT to record the Cancellation. FSWT
recorded the Cancellation after receiving instructions from Indymac, having had no
notice that the beneficiary had changed by Assignment. (R. at 324; R. at 410). Indymac
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had been the servicer of the Deed of Trust, and in accordance with industry standards,
FSWT acted reasonably when it did not question Indymac's instruction or Indymac's
authority to give those instructions, especially where it believed Deutsche to still be the
beneficiary. (R. at 324; R. at 410; R. at 529-533.)
FSWT also acted reasonably when it did not obtain a title search before recording
the Cancellation. (R. at 312; R. at 315; R. at 324; R. at 410.) While an updated title
search would have revealed the Assignment, it was not the industry standard or custom to
obtain a title search before recording a cancellation of notice of default at the instruction
of a beneficiary. The undisputed Affidavits established the standard of care and the
reasonableness of FS WT's actions. Even drawn in the light most favorable to RJW as
the non-moving party, the facts are still undisputed and the fact finder's conclusion was
reasonable.
RJW argues that the standard of care was not "fixed by law" under Wycalis. In
the alternative it argues that the standard of care was established by Utah Code Ann. §
57-1-21.5, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31, and case law. (Appellant's Br. at 23-27.) In
support of its argument that the standard of care was fixed by law, RJW cites Russell v.
Lundberg, 120 P.3d 541 (Utah 2005). Russell is inapplicable because it deals with the
duty between a trustee and trustor, not between a trustee and beneficiary. RJW also cites
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989) and
Five F, L.L.C. v Heritage Savings Bank, 81 P.3d 105 (Utah 2003) to establish that FSWT
had a duty to RJW and was required to comply with the statutes.
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negligence claim, Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 825 n.5, and which required RJW to prove an
actual breach of duty by FSWT, Fields v. Daisy Gold Mining Co., 73 P. 521, 522 (Utah
1903). By failing to dispute the standard-of-industry evidence or that FSWT acted
reasonably, RJW failed to prove the element of a breach of duty in light of the factually
established standard of care. The trial court was justified in holding that: "Since
Southwestern Title did not have notice that Deutsche Bank was no longer the beneficiary,
and the industry standard of care did not require Southwestern Title to question Deutsche
Bank's instructions or do an updated title search, Southwestern Title did not breach its
duty as trustee as a matter of law." (R. at 533.)
D.

The Affidavits were sufficient to present standard in the industry
evidence and to factually establish the standard of care.

Even if issues and objections cited by RJW had been preserved for appeal, the
Affidavits were still sufficient to provide the trial court with standard-in-industry
evidence and factually establish the standard of care. FSWT presented the Affidavits of
Kathy A. Davis and Melven E. Smith, both seasoned attorneys working in Utah's title
and foreclosure industry, as standard-of-industry evidence in order to establish the
standard of care and show that FSWT acted reasonably within the industry. (R. at 311316.) The Affidavits were undisputed and the trial court reasonably concluded that
FSWT did not breach a duty. (R. at 409-416; R. at 433; R. at 533.)
Utah law emphasizes the need for standard of the industry evidence to determine
the standard of care. Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 826. The Wycalis court concluded that where
the standard of care was not "fixed by law", the standard of care must be established
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factually by standard-in-industry evidence, Id., 780 P.2d at 826, and affirmed summary
judgment against the defendant Guardian Title because it did not provide standard of the
industry evidence, Id., 780 P.2d at 827. FSWT had no intention of making that same
mistake and submitted the Affidavits to provide standard-in-industry evidence in support
of its Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Affidavits are not expert testimony. FSWT was only required to present the
testimony of qualified witnesses who worked in the same trade or profession. Ortiz, 939
P.2d at 1217. The Ortiz court held ".. .that the standard of care in a trade or profession
must be determined by testimony of witnesses in the same trade or profession...however
Utah law does not require expert testimony to establish the standard of care in every
negligence case." Ortiz, 939 P.2d at 1217. While Wycalis states that "Expert testimony
may be particularly helpful in elucidating the standard of care applicable here..." and in
other cases involving professionals, the Wycalis court did not go so far as to say that
expert testimony was needed in all cases concerning a trade or profession, or that an
expert is necessary is all cases involving a title company. Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 826 n.8
{emphasis added.) The Wycalis court's underlying concern about the need for experts
was that a jury would not be able to understand the duties owed by Guardian Title. Id.,
780 P.2d at 827. That problem is not present here. RJW Media did not make a jury
demand, (R. at 1 -18), and the trial court, acting as fact finder, determined that it
understood the standard of care and that the standard of care was established factually by
uncontroverted standard-of-industry evidence, (R. at 529-533.)
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court's order, was helpful to a determination of a fact in issue, namely whether the
foreclosure industry required a trustee to question the instructions of a purported
beneficiary. (R. at 529-533.)
Finally, RJW cannot argue that it was prejudiced by the use of the Affidavits. As
the plaintiff, RJW could have produced its own expert testimony to establish the standard
of care, just as it was RJW's burden to establish all elements of its cause of action against
FSWT. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 135 (Utah 1989) (A plaintiff in a medical
malpractice bears the burden of establishing the standard of care by expert testimony);
Weber, 752 P.2d at 1367. RJW could also have resorted to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) at any
time to request additional time to produce equivalent lay testimony or expert testimony
and provide counter-affidavits. There was no valid reason for RJW not to produce
counter-affidavits, unless it simply could not dispute the facts presented. The lack of
material dispute justified the trial court's determination that the standard of care was
factually established and that FSWT did not breach its duty. If this matter were to be
remanded, the trial court would be faced with the same evidence and would have no
choice but to reach the same conclusion. It would be a waste of judicial resources to
remand this matter for further proceedings where the evidence presented to the trial court
was uncontroverted.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing facts, argument, and authorities cited, Appellee First
Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc. requests that this Court affirm the decision of
the trial court to grant summary judgment to First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah,
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Inc. Pursuant to Utah R. App. Proc. 34, FSWT requests an award of its costs incurred in
responding to RJW's appeal.
Dated this ^Hday

of October, 2007.
CASTLE MEINHOLD & STAWIARSKI

Mark S. Middlemas
Attorney for Appellee First Southwestern Title Agency
of Utah, Inc.
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Yes, let's go off the

record .
(Off-the-record
Q.
And

discussion.)

(By Mr. Coebergh)

Back on the record.

at what point in time did -- if at all, did First

Southwestern

become aware that the

beneficial

interest of this Trust Deed had been assigned
Media,

to RJW

Inc.?

A.

First Southwestern was never notified.

We

found out after legal counsel, after I was asked to
have a date done, I guess, after the time you called
us.

I don't know who was called when.

I wasn't a

part of that.
Q.

Okay.

A.

But had no idea that RJW had an interest,

Q.

And just to clarify your answer, were you

talking about when you personally

first became aware

that RJW was a beneficiary of this Trust
A.

Yes, personally.

Q.

And then just to clarify

Deed?

I mean, I had no idea.
the record, do

you know when First Southwestern became aware that
RJW was a beneficiary of this Trust
A.

Deed?

I don't have an exact date on that

because nobody contacted

First Southwestern Title.

There was no contact from RJW.
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today?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And what is this document?

A.

Assignment of Trust Deed from

Deutsche

Bank to RJW, and attorneys -- you know, obviously
there was an agreement between Deutsche
Q.
"After

and IndyMac.

And on the top of this document

recording, mail to:

it states,

First Southwestern

Title

Agency of Utah . "
A.

Uh-huh

(affirmative).

Q.

"102 West 500 South, Suite 300."

A.

Yes.

Q.

Which was the main office

A.

Right.

Q.

- - that you gave to me earlier?

address --

As you sit here today, do you know if this
document was actually sent to First Southwestern at
or about July 30th of 2004?

First

A.

I don't know.

It didn't come to me.

Q.

And do you know if it came to anybody at

Southwestern?
A.

I don' t.

Q.

And so you cannot

First Southwestern
A.

tell me when anybody at

first received this document?

I can' t .
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this Cancellation of Notice of Default?

A.

Per instructions of our client, or the

attorneys.
Q.
that

And who was First Southwestern's client at

time?
A,

Shapiro & Meinhold.
MR. MIDDLEMAS:
THE WITNESS:

The client?
Oh, the client was

IndyMac

Bank, but who was, I guess.
Q.
IndyMac

(By Mr. Coebergh)

So the client was

Bank?

A.

Uh-huh

Q.

And Shapiro & Meinhold were the attorneys

representing

(affirmative).

IndyMac

Bank?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, do you know specifically whether

instruction

I guess that's the way it works.
the

to issue or record this Cancellation of

Notice of Default came from IndyMac Bank or from the
attorneys?
A.

Our instructions came from the attorneys.

Q.

Shapiro & Meinhold?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And do you know who at Shapiro & Meinhold

gave that
A.

instruction?
I don't have her name with me.

CITICOURT, LLC
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speaking, after

like this to record
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receiving an

a Cancellation of

Notice of Default, does First Southwestern conduct an
independent

investigation

--

A.

Not with a cancellation.

Q.

Not with a cancellation?

A.

No.

Q.

Why not?

A.

Because a cancellation

is saying the

notice has either been -- they've either brought it
current or it's been paid off and they're done with
it, they've closing the file.

There's no reason for

us to do anything else.
Q.
containing

Did this instruction or this letter
the instruction to record

the cancellation

come from a local office of Shapiro & Meinhold?
A.

Yes.

It's in our -- well, it's not here

in Salt Lake, no.
Q.

Where was that office

located?

A.

It's in Colorado Springs.

Q.

Does the Trustee's Sale Guaranty

file that

we have been discussing, does that file contain other
additional
A.

letters from Shapiro & Meinhold?
Probably

the recording of when the first

Notice of Default went on.

That's

CITICOURT, LLC
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A.

No.

Q.

To your knowledge, has First

41

Southwestern

had any communications with RJW Media, Inc. at any
point

in time?
A.

No.

Q.

After First Southwestern

received

of this lawsuit, has any communication

notice

occurred

between First Southwestern and IndyMac, any
representative of

IndyMac?

A.

No.

Q.

Any communication

in that same time frame

between First Southwestern and Shapiro & Meinhold?
A.

After the lawsuit?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And can you tell me, first of all, when

did those communications take place?
A.

I believe after the lawsuit was filed,

which was the fall of last year, I believe.
remember exact dates.

It was brought to my

I don't
attention

if -- because I hadn't - - I didn't receive any
paperwork or phone call that they would like us to
conduct

—

to go up and re-investigate

this property

to see if what you were talking about was
true, which we did.

actually

And we went up and conducted a
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feel that First Southwestern
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adequately

all of its duties in this case?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And why do you say that?

A.

We followed our normal procedures.

If we

receive a Cancellation of Notice of Default, we would
definitely
Q.

just record it.
But as I understand your

were not personally

testimony, you

involved with those procedures as

to this particular piece of property;

is that

correct?
A.

That' s correct.

Q.

It was Charlene Williams

and somebody

else

on behalf of -A.

No.

Charlene Williams wouldn't have had

anything to do with it when the cancellation of the
default came in.
Q.
at that
A.

So who at First Southwestern

was involved

time?
At that particular time, the only person

that I can see was the person that actually

signed

the document would have been Shauna Burke.
Q.

And you testified

she's no longer with the

company?
A.

No.

CITICOURT, LLC
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Let's go off the record

Maybe take a three-minute

break.

(Break)
(EXHIBIT-7 WAS MARKED.)
Q.

(By Mr. Coebergh)

Ms. Blanco, we're

almost done.
A.

Okay.

Q.

At least I am almost done.

A.

All right.

Q.

Could you please take a look at Exhibit 7,

which is page 18.
A.

(Pause)

Q.

And, Ms. Blanco, have you ever seen this

letter before

today?

A.

I have not.

Q.

Do you know if that letter

the Trustee's Sale Guaranty

in

is contained

in

file?

A.

To my knowledge, it is not.

Q.

Do you know if this letter

any other file within First

is contained

Southwestern?

A.

No.

Q.

So you basically don't know if First

Southwestern ever received this

letter?

A.

I have - - no, I don ' t.

Q.

And I will still ask the question.

CITICOURT, LLC
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Shauna Burke or anybody else at First

49

Southwestern

have any communications, first of all, with

anybody

at I n d y M a c or Deutsche Bank after receiving

this

letter?
A.

To my knowledge, don't.

Q.

And you already testified

Southwestern
A.

First

never had any communication with RJW.
As to my knowledge, that's correct.
MR. COEBERGH:

Mr. Farmer

I think that's all I have.

still has questions.
MR. FARMER:

I don't know.

Actually, I have a few

questions, but it's not too complicated, nonetheless.
THE WITNESS:

Okay.

EXAMINATION
BY MR.

FARMER:

Q.
attorney

My name is Dana Farmer and I'm

the

in this matter for the other defendants, CIT

Group and Westland Title dba Lincoln Title

Insurance

Agency.
I want to make sure that I get a feel for
your internal
going on.

processes here so I understand what is

You received, did you -- when I say you, I

mean First Southwestern Title.

When

First

Southwestern Title Company was first contacted

to

commence the foreclosure, did that come to you from

CITICOURT, LLC
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A.

I don ' t .

Q.

All right.

40

Looking at the document, can

you identify who -- who is the seller

in this

document?
A.

Deutsche Bank.

Q.

And who is the buyer?

A.

RJW.

Q.

And who is the borrower?

A.

Alan Squires.

Q.

Can you generally describe the terms of

the agreement?
MR. COEBERGH:

Objection.

Vague and over

broad.
Q.
of this

(By Mr. Middlemas)

What was the purpose

agreement?

A.

The purpose of this agreement was to

enable RJW Media to purchase the note that Alan
Squires had issued

to IndyMac Bank and obtain an

assignment of the Trust Deed and lien on the
underlying
Q.

property.
Why did they want to do that?
MR. COEBERGH:

I'm

sorry.

calls for attorney/client privileged
Q.

(By Mr. Middlemas)

That

question

information.

Was a copy of this

agreement provided, to your knowledge, to First

CitiCourt, LLC
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Southwestern Title at any time before you became the
substituted Trustee on the IndyMac Deed of Trust?
A.

No.

Q.

Why was this not provided

Southwestern

Title?
MR. COEBERGH:

calls for attorney/client
Q.

to First

Objection.
privileged

(By Mr. Middlemas)

That

question

information.

Who do you believe was

the Trustee on the Deed of Trust?
A.

Let me restate my prior question.

Media did not provide a copy of this.
any idea whether

RJW

I don't have

IndyMac Bank would have provided a

copy of this to First Southwestern Title.

that

Q.

But it's your testimony

that you did not?

A.

That RJW did not.

Q.

Did you as attorney or Trustee

provide

document?
A.

No.

Q.

Can I ask why you didn't?
MR. COEBERGH:

attorney/client privileged
Q.

Objection.
information.

(By Mr. Middlemas)

as you understand

Calls for

Who was the Trustee --

it, who was the Trustee at the

time -- who was the Trustee on the Deed of Trust at
the time that this document was executed?

CitiCourt, LLC
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that existed on the property, the lien, over to RJW
Medi a.
Q.

And when was this document

A.

It indicates here July

Q.

And

A.

The date stamp indicates August 9th.

Q.

At the top left of the assignment

document

executed?

30th.

recorded?

reads, "After recording mail

Southwest Title."

Do you see that

to:

the

First

there?

A.

I do.

Q.

It also gives First Southwestern

Title's

address, does it not?
A.

Um-hum.

(Affirmative).

Q.

Is it your understanding

that after

this

document was recorded on August 9th that the
assignment was mailed back to First Southwest

Title

or to Wrona & Parrish?
A.

To First Southwestern Title.

Q.

Okay.

If you'll go down to the paragraph

under the legal description.
A.

Um-hum.

(Affirmative).

Q.

There is a time stamp for the

A.

Um-hum.

Q.

Who appears to be the requesting

recording.

(Affirmative).

under that time stamp?

CitiCourt, LLC

party
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A.

Thi s law firm.

Q.

Okay.

a party

Is it your understanding

-- as a Trustee, and having worked

59

that when
in real

estate transactions, when you request the County
Recorder

to record a document is the document

typically mailed back to the requesting party or
another

party?

A.

I'm not sure I understand

the question.

Q.

When you request a document to be recorded

from the County Recorder -A.

Um-hum.

(Affirmative).

Q.

-- do they typically mail that document

back to you as the requesting party or to the
document
A.

-- or to the party noted?
I think this is a question

more

appropriate for the County Recorder, but my
experience has been they send the document to the
party that's indicated on the document

being

recorded.
Q.

All right.

Are you aware -- have you had

a chance to review the requests for

admissions?

A.

Uh-huh.

(Affirmative).

Q.

Are you aware that your firm —

that RJW Media admitted
actually

that the document

sent back to Wrona & Parrish

CitiCourt, LLC
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A.

Say that again.

Q.

After

62

the Assignment of Deed of Trust was

recorded did you have any further communications
Amy or anyone else at First Southwest
A.

To my knowledge, no.

Q.

Okay.

All right.

with

Title?

Let's take a look at

the next exhi bit.
We'll mark this as Exhibit
corresponds

to page 24.

as Exhibit Number 7.

7.

It

And we'll have this marked

September 9th, 2004.

Title

commitment.
What is this document?
A.

A Commitment for Title

Q.

Have you seen this document

A.

Yes.
MR. COEBERGH:

Insurance.

Make sure you

before?

review all

the pages.
THE WITNESS:
Q.

(Looking at document).

(By Mr. Middlemas)

Yes,

What is the date of

this document?
A.

The date -- it has an effective date of

September 9th.
Q.

And what is the purpose of this document?

A,

To indicate that -- the status of the

title as of the effective date.

CitiCourt, LLC
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recorded.
Q.

(By Mr. Middlemas)

Okay.

To your

knowledge, did First Southwestern Title mail a copy
of this document to you?
A.

No.

Q.

What about to RJW Media, Inc.?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

Other than the communication you

had with Amy, as of September 22nd, 2004, the date
when this document was recorded, had you communicated
with First Southwestern Title about the change of
benefici ari es?
A.

There was a -- no.

Q.

Okay.

And you stated that you first found

out about the Cancellation of Notice of Default some
months after the sale, is that correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

How many months would you say?

A.

When we received notice I believe it was

in April.

Almost five months.

Q.

What was your reaction?

A.

Surpri se.

Q.

What did you do about it?

A.

What did I do about it?

Q.

Yes.
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Mark Middlemas
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

Alan Spriggs [aspriggs@co.summit.ut.us]
Monday, May 08, 2006 11:22 AM
Mark Middlemas
RE: Assignment of Deed of Trust Doc. No. 00706979

MR. MIDDLEMAS,
OUR POLICY REGARDING THE RETURN OF RECORDED DOCUMENTS AS OUTLINED IN YOUR
E-MAIL IS CORRECT.
AS PER STATE STATUTE SUMMIT COUNTY MAINTAINS A FEE AND ENTRY INDEX SHOWING
THE PARTY THAT REQUESTED THE RECORDATION OF A DOCUMENT AND THE RETURN TO
NAME AND ADDRESS USED TO RETURN THE DOCUMENT.
AS PER YOUR REQUEST I WILL FAX A COPY OF OUR FEE AND ENTRY INDEX TO YOU.
ALAN SPRIGGS
COUNTY RECORDER
Original Message
From: Mark Middlemas [mailto:mmiddlemas@LOGS.com]
Sent: Friday, May 05, 2006 3:53 PM
To: aspriggs@co.summit. ut.us
Subject: Assignment of Deed of Trust Doc. No. 00706979
Mr. Spriggs,
Thank you for speaking with me today. Pursuant to our telephone conversation
I am writing to ask you to confirm the information we discussed:
1) It is the policy of Summit County to return the original recorded
document to the party that requested the recording;
2) This is typically true even if the document on its face says that once
the document is recorded it is to be sent to another party;
3) Summit County will send the original document to a recipient other than
the requesting party if there is a self-addressed stamped envelope provided
which is addressed to an alternative recipient;
4) This policy was in effect in 2004.
Specifically, I am trying to determine whether the original recorded
Assignment of Deed of Trust (recorded August 9, 2004, No. 00706979 Book 1639
Pg 0034, and requested by Wrona & Parrish) was mailed to Wrona & Parrish. It
would seem according to the policy in effect that the original recorded
document would have mailed to Wrona & Parrish. You mentioned that you may
be able to find the mailing label if it still exists. Please let me know if
that information is available.
Thank you again for your time and assistance in this matter.
Mark S. Middlemas
> Castle Meinhold & Stawiarski
102 West 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Tel. (801)533-5361 xll2
Fax (801)961-9575
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RJW MEDIA, INC, a Texas corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

THE CIT GROUP/CONSUMER
FINANCE, INC. a Delaware corporation; and
WESTLAND TITLE INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC. a Utah corporation, d/b/a
LINCOLN TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY,
and FIRST SOUTWESTERN TITLE
AGENCY OF UTAH, INC., a Utah
corporation,

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO
DEFENDANT FIRST SOUTHWESTERN
TITLE AGENCY OF UTAH, INC'S FIRST
SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS,
AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
Case No. 050500373

Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rules 33, 34 and 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff RJW
Media, Inc. ("RJW Media"), by and through its undersigned counsel of record, hereby responds
to Defendant's First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Jnc.'s ("FSWT") First Set of
Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents and Requests for Admissions as follows:

INTERROGATORIES
GENERAL OBJECTIONS
RJW Media, by and through its counsel of record, objects to FSWT's First Set of
Interrogatories insofar as they call for information which is protected from discovery by the
Attorney-Client Communication and/or Work Product Privileges. No inadvertent production or
disclosure of any privileged information or privileged document shall constitute a waiver of the
applicable privilege.
To the extent that any information requested in these discovery requests is not available
to RJW Media or is equally available or accessible to FSWT, RJW Media objects to such
discovery request.
The responses contained in these Responses to Interrogatories are to the best ability and
information of RJW Media. RJW Media reserves the right to supplement these responses after
completion of discovery and/or to introduce evidence at the time of trial or hearing based upon
information and/or documents located, developed or discovered after the date of these responses
which evidence may supplement, modify or be in conflict with these responses. RJW Media
acknowledges its continuing obligation to supplement his responses contained herein and
reminds FSWT of the same responsibility.
Any answers to these discovery requests which in whole or in part voluntarily provide
information or refer to materials which may be inadmissible on any evidentiary ground are not
intended as a waiver of any objection of any nature, including any applicable privilege, the
discoverability or admissibility of any and all information and materials. Furthermore, RJW
Media reserves its right to object to the admissibility or legal applicability of any such
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information or materials provided during the course of other discovery, pleadings, motions or the
trial of this matter.
SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: State the full name of the Plaintiff, where and when
Plaintiff was incorporated, where Plaintiff is licensed to do business, where it has its principal
place of business and all names under which it does business.
RESPONSE: Plaintiffs foil name is RJ.W. Media, Inc. The company is incorporated
in Dallas, Texas.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: State the nature of Plaintiffs business, the number of
Plaintiffs employees, and the approximate annual gross revenue of Plaintiff s business.
RESPONSE: Objection. Interrogatory No. 2 calls for information beyond the scope of
discovery, is not reasonably relevant to the matters at hand, seeks information that is cumulative,
unduly burdensome, and is intended to harass, annoy, and needlessly burden Plaintiff in its
attempts to respond to FSWT's discovery requests.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Describe in detail Plaintiffs ownership interest in the
Property, or if Plaintiff does not claim to own title to the Property, please describe in detail
Plaintiffs relationship to the Property, and identify any documents supporting its ownership
interest in the Property.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff is the fee simple owner of the Property, having purchased the
Property at the Trustee's Sale on December 13, 2004.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Describe in detail why FSWT is liable to RJW, and please
state:
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a.

What, if any, specific conduct established a duty owed by FSWT to RJW;

b.

What, if any, specific conduct constituted a breach of an alleged duty

and,

owed by FSWT to RJW?
RESPONSE: Objection. Interrogatory No. 4 actually consists of two (2) interrogatories.
In addition, Interrogatory No. 4 requests that Plaintiff state legal conclusions regarding FSWT's
legal duty to Plaintiff. Without waiving these objections, Plaintiff responds as follows:
On or about July 28, 2004, RJW purchased the IndyMac Note and became the beneficiary
under the IndyMeic Trust Deed; at that time, FSWT was the successor trustee under the Trust
Deed. As trustee under the Trust Deed, FSWT owed a fiduciary duty to RJW, as the beneficiary
of said deed, until the date that FSWT was removed from its position as Trustee.

FSWT

breached that duty to RJW by: (1) issuing a Cancellation of Notice of Default on or about
September 20, 2004, without permission, authorization, or direction from RJW, the beneficiary
under the IndyMac Trust Deed; and (2) failing to give notice to RJW its unauthorized issuance of
the Cancellation of Notice of Default.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify and describe the nature, source, and cause of any
damages suffered, as of today's date, by RJW as a result of FSWTs alleged breach of duty.
RESPONSE: All damages suffered by Plaintiff are not yet known or knowable to
Plaintiff at this time, and may not be known until trial; Plaintiff reserves its right to amend
damages provided herein as new information is discovered.

Plaintiff will endeavor to

supplement these responses as new information is discovered. Without waiving these objections,
Plaintiff responds as follows:
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FSWT's breaches have resulted in a cloud on the title of the property owned by RJW and
Plaintiff has been forced to bring this action in order to protect itself against the attempted
foreclosure by junior lienholder CIT. the expenses of that action, and any adverse consequences
that result from the cloud caused by FSWT's breaches constitute recoverable damages.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: State the dollar amount of any damages, which you have
suffered to date, as a result of FSWT's alleged breach of duty. If you have suffered no damages
to date, please so state.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount of at least $24,305.41 to date.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Identify and describe in detail the method you used to
calculate the dollar amount of your damages.
RESPONSE:

The "method" used by Plaintiff to calculate damages involved the

arithmetic summation of costs and attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Identify all efforts you made to mitigate the damages
described in your responses to Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s
Interrogatories 5-6.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff attempted to convince CIT to withdraw its notice of sale. When
that effort failed, Plaintiff sought and was granted an open-ended TRO enjoining CIT from
conducting its sale.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Describe in detail any efforts made by you, S. Blake
Parrish, the law firm of Wrona & Parrish, or as any other party of whom you have knowledge, to
"date down" the Property's title at the time S. Blake Parrish became successor trustee on the
Indymac Deed of Trust.
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RESPONSE: Objection. Interrogatory No. 9 is vague and confusing, and Plaintiff is
unable to ascertain FSWT's meaning by the undefined phrase "date down."
INTERROGATORY NO, 10: Identify and describe the reasons why RJW did not
record a Notice of Default after S. Blake Parrish became the successor trustee of the Indymac
Deed of Trust.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff was not required to record a Notice of Default.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Describe in detail any efforts made by you, S. Blake
Parrish, the law firm of Wrona & Parrish, or of any other party of whom you have knowledge, to
"date down" the Property's title after October 28, 2004 and prior to the December 13, 2004
foreclosure sale.
RESPONSE: Objection. See Plaintiffs Response to Interrogatory No. 9, above.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify the title search guarantee, or any title search
document, used by you, S. Blake Parrish, or the law firm of Wrona & Parrish, to "date down" the
Property prior to the December 13, 2004 sale, and identify the date that the document was
produced, the person or entity that produced that document, and the name of any title insurer or
other entity that guaranteed clear title prior to the December 13, 2004 sale.
RESPONSE: Objection. See Plaintiffs Response to Interrogatory No. 9, above.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Identify and describe any and all efforts made by you,
prior to the December 13, 2004 sale, to provide FSWT with notice of RJW's purchase of the
Indymac Deed of Tmst and/or of the Assignment of Deed of Trust, and identify any evidence, of
whatever kind, of your efforts to notify PS"\VT of RJW's purchase of the Indymac Deed of Trust
and/or the Assignment of the Deed of Trust
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RESPONSE: The Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded by Park City Title on or
about July 30, 2004. In addition, Plaintiff sent correspondence to FSWT informing it that Blake
Parrish was substituted as Trustee on or about November 16, 2004. The Substitution of Trustee
was executed by Plaintiff and provides: "RJW Media, Inc, is the Beneficiary under the Trust
Deed pursuant to an Assignment of Trust Deed dated July 30, 2004, recorded August 9, 2004, as
Entry No. 00706979, in Book 01639, at Page 000034, in the records of the County Recorder of
Summit County, State of Utah."
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Describe what specific conduct by you, FSWT, or the
other parties to the sale made the December 13, 2004 sale valid.
RESPONSE: FSWT, acting in its capacity as Trustee of the IndyMac Trust Deed and
Note, filed a Notice of Default in Summit County on or about October 2, 2003. Blake Parrish, as
successor trustee, relying upon the existing Notice of Default, as described more fully above at
Response to Interrogatory No. 9, above, observed the notice of trustee's sale requirements set
forth in Section 57-1-25 of the Utah Code by publication in the Park Record, a publication of
general circulation in Park City, Summit Comity, State of Utah, posting a copy of the Notice of
Sale on the property in question and posting the Notice of Sale in the Summit County Recorder's
Office.

In addition, Blake Parrish sent notice to all individuals holding an interest in the

property, including CIT Group and Alan Squires. The trustee's sale was conducted by Blake
Parrish as trustee in Summit County, Utah on December 13, 2004.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Describe in detail when and how you, and your attorneys,
became aware of the Cancellation of Notice of Default.
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RESPONSE: Approximately five (5) months after completion of the Trustee's sale,
Plaintiff received a copy of a Notice of Default filed by CIT Group's Trustee, Lincoln Title
Insurance Agency.
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Identify all correspondence from you to FSWT, Indymac
Bank, Deustche Bank, or their attorneys or agents.
RESPONSE: Objection.

Interrogatory No. 16 seeks information that is overbroad,

cumulative, unduly burdensome, vague, and is intended to harass, annoy, and needlessly burden
Plaintiff in its attempts to respond to FSWT's discovery requests. Interrogatory No. 16 is not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; moreover, Plaintiff is not
in a position to know all attorneys and/or agents of the parties identified in Interrogatory No. 16.
Without waiving these objections and in the spirit of cooperation, Plaintiff volunteers the
following information:
A copy of the Substitution of Trustee was sent to FSWT.
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Identify and describe the reasons why RJW has not
recorded a Notice of Default after December 13,2004.
RESPONSE: Because Plaintiff had no obligation to do so.
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Identify any persons who prepared these answers and
any and all sources used to do so.
RESPONSE: All answers to these Interrogatories were prepared by Plaintiff and/or
Plaintiffs Counsel All sources used to respond to these Interrogatories have been included
pursuant to FSWT's Request for Production of Documents, below.
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
GENERAL OBJECTIONS
RJW Media, by and through his counsel of record, objects to FSWT's First Set of
Requests for Production of Documents insofar as these document requests call for information or
documents that are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or any other
privilege recognized by law, prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial, or which reflect mental
impressions, conclusions or opinions or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a
party concerning this action or otherwise. In responding to FSWT's document requests, RJW
Media will not provide information or documents that are privileged, proprietary, confidential or
otherwise immune from discovery.
To the extent that any information or documents requested in these document requests is
not available to RJW Media or is equally available or accessible to FSWT, RJW Media objects
to such a document request.
RJW Media further objects to FSWT's discovery requests to the extent that they call for
production of documents and information that are not within RJW Media's possession, custody
or control No objection made herein, or lack thereof, shall be deemed an admission by RJW
Media as to the existence of any document.

No statement that RJW Media will produce

requested documents shall be deemed a representation that such documents exist, but rather that
RJW Media will produce documents to the extent that they do exist and are in RJW Media's
possession, custody or control
The responses contained in these responses to Request for Production are to the best
ability and information of RJW Media. RJW Media reserves the right to supplement these
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answers after completion of discovery and/or to introduce evidence at the time of trial or hearing
based upon information and/or documents located, developed or discovered after the date of
these answers which evidence may supplement, modify or be in conflict with the responses
contained herein.

RJW Media acknowledges its continuing obligation to supplement its

responses contained herein and reminds FSWT of the same responsibility.
Inadvertent production of any information or document by way of these responses shall
not constitute a waiver of any privilege or any other ground for objecting to discovery with
respect to such document or such other document, or with respect to the subject matter thereof or
the information contained therein, nor shall such inadvertent production waive the right of RJW
Media to object to the use of any such document or the information contained therein during this
or any subsequent proceeding.
RJW Media reserves the right (1) to produce any document relating to the subject matter
of a Request that is objected to on the grounds of burden, overbreadth or vagueness that would
have been produced pursuant to a properly drawn Request relating to the same subject matter or
that is produced pursuant to any other of the Requests; (2) to produce only the responsive
portions of documents where such documents also contain information which is not responsive
to a Request or is privileged; and (3) to produce documents as they are kept in its files and will
not produce them with reference to a particular Request. The words "RJW Media will produce"
or "RJW Media will supplement" certain documents called for by a Request will mean that RJW
Media will produce only documents that are not withlield on the grounds of an objection, but the
words shall not mean that such documents exist or are within RJW Media's possession, custody
or control.
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RESERVATION OF RIGHTS
RJW Media reserves the right (1) to produce any document relating to the subject matter
of a Request that is objected to on the grounds of burden, overbreadth or vagueness that would
have been produced pursuant to a properly drawn Request relating to the same subject matter or
that is produced pursuant to any other of the Requests; (2) to produce only the responsive
portions of documents where such documents also contain information which is not responsive
to a Request or is privileged; and (3) to produce documents as they are kept in its files and will
not produce them with reference to a particular Request. The words "RJW Media will produce"
or "RJW Media will supplement" certain documents called for by a Request will mean that RJW
Media will produce only documents that are not withheld on the grounds of an objection, but the
words shall not mean that such documents exist or are within RJW Media's possession, custody
or control
SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST NO. 1:

All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to,

Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 3.
RESPONSE: See documents Bates stamped 44 to 46.
REQUEST NO. 2:

All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to,

Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 4.
RESPONSE: See documents Bates stamped 47 to 55.
REQUEST NO. 3:

All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to,

Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc. s interrogatory number 5
RESPONSE: No supporting documents provided.
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REQUEST NO. 4:

All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to,

Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 6.
RESPONSE: See documents Bates stamped 56 to 61.
REQUEST NO. 5:

All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to,

Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 7.
RESPONSE: Same as Plaintiffs Response to Request No. 4, above.
REQUEST NO. 6:

All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to,

Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 8.
RESPONSE: See documents Bates stamped 62 to 69.
REQUEST NO. 7:

All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to,

Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 9.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff does not possess any documents responsive to Request No. 1.
REQUEST NO. 8:

All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to,

Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 10.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff does not possess any documents responsive to Request No. 8.
REQUEST NO. 9:

All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to,

Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 11.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff does not possess any documents responsive to Request No. 9.
REQUEST NO. 10: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to,
Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 12.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff does not possess any documents responsive to Request No. 10.
REQUEST NO. 11: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to,
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Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 13.
RESPONSE: See documents Bates stamped 70 to 74.
REQUEST NO. 12:

All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to,

Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 14.
RESPONSE: See documents Bates stamped 75 to 80. See also Plaintiffs Response to
Request No. 7, above.
REQUEST NO. 13:

All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to,

Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 15.
RESPONSE: See documents Bates stamped 81 to 83.
REQUEST NO. 14:

All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to,

Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.!s interrogatory number 16.
RESPONSE: See Plaintiffs response to Request No. 4, above.
REQUEST NO. 15:

All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to,

Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 17.
RESPONSE: See Plaintiffs Response to Request No. 1, above.
REQUEST NO. 16:

All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to,

Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 18.
RESPONSE: No documents available.
REQUEST NO. 17: Please provide a copy of the Special Warranty Deed, attached and
marked as Exhibit H to your Complaint, showing the recording date and stamp of the county
clerk.
RESPONSE: See documents Bates stamped 84 to 86.

13

REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS

REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that you did not mail a copy of the Assignment of Deed of
Trust to FSWT prior to the December 13, 2004 foreclosure sale.
RESPONSE: Admit that FSWT received notice of the assignment of the Deed of Trust
in the Substitution of Trustee provided by Blake Parrish to FSWT.
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that after the Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded, it was
returned to Wrona & Parrish, and not FSWT.
RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that prior to the December 13, 2004 foreclosure sale, you never
telephoned FSWT to inform FSWT of the Assignment of Deed of Trust.
RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that pursuant to the July 28, 2004 Note Purchase and Sale
Agreement fl[ 5) you covenanted with Deutsche Bank to stop all collection activity against the
borrower.
RESPONSE: Deny.
REQUEST NO. 5: Admit that pursuant to the July 28, 2004 Note Purchase and Sale
Agreement flffl 9 and 11) that you agreed to indemnify Deustche Bank, its successors, assigns,
attorneys and agents from all claims, losses, actions, damages, liabilities and expenses arising
from, related to or in connection with the Property, the Loan Documents, or the Indebtedness.
RESPONSE: Admit.
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REQUEST NO. 6: Admit that prior to the December 13, 2004 foreclosure sale, you never
faxed, mailed or e-mailed to FSWT a letter to inform FSWT that RJW was the beneficiary of the
Indymac Trust Deed.
RESPONSE: Deny.
REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that as of October 28, 2004, S. Blake Parrish of Wrona &
Parrish was the trustee of the Indymac Deed of Trust.
RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST NO. 8: Admit that you did not mail a copy of the recorded Substitution of
Trustee to FSWT.
RESPONSE: Deny.
REQUEST NO. 9: Admit that you did not "date down" at the time S. Blake Parrish
became the successor trustee.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff cannot admit or deny without clarification of the phrase "date
down."
REQUEST NO. 10: Admit that as of December 13, 2004, Wrona & Parrish represented
you in the purchase of the Indymac Deed of Trust.
RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST NO. 11: Admit that as of December 13, 2004, you were the beneficiary of the
Indymac Deed of Trust.
RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST NO. 12: Admit that S. Blake Parrish, Jr. did not inform you of the cancelled
notice of default prior to the December 13, 2004 sale.
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RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST NO. 13: Admit that no person identified as an attorney, agent, or employee of
the law firm of Wrona & Parrish informed you of the cancelled notice of default prior to the
December 13, 2004 sale.
RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST NO. 14: Admit that S. Blake Parrish did not "date down" prior to the
December 13, 2004 sale.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff cannot admit or deny without clarification of the phrase "date
down."
REQUEST NO. 15: Admit that S. Blake Parrish personally conducted the December 13,
2004 sale.
RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST NO. 16: Admit that you were the successful bidder at the sale.
RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST NO. 17: Admit that the December 13, 2004 sale was valid.
RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST NO. 18: Admit that the December 13, 2004 sale was void.
RESPONSE: Deny.
REQUEST NO. 19: Admit that there is still an outstanding arrearage unpaid and in
default on the Indymac Deed of Trust.
RESPONSE: Admit.
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REQUEST NO. 20: Admit that since December 13, 2004, you have not recorded a
Notice of Default on the Property.
RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST NO. 21: Admit that since December 13, 2004, RJW has not recorded a
Notice of Trustee's Sale.
RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST NO. 22: Admit that RJW purchased title to the Property.
RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST NO. 23: Admit that the Special Warranty Deed, attached and marked as Exhibit H to
Plaintiffs Complaint, is a conveyance oftitle to the Property to youfiomSpyglass Development IXC.
RESPONSE: Deny.
REQUEST NO. 24: Admit that RJW is the title owner ofthe Property.
RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST NO. 25: Admit that FSWT owes no duty to RJW.
RESPONSE: Deny.
REQUEST NO. 26: Admitthat RJW has no actual damages caused by FSWT.
RESPONSE: Deny.
REQUEST NO. 27: Admit that you paid $1,600,000.00 dollars forte Property.
RESPONSE: Deny.
REQUEST NO. 28: Admit that at the end of2004, the Property was worlli approxrmately
$2,086,774.00.
RESPONSE: Deny.
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REQUEST NO. 29: Admit that at the time of the execution of the Note Purchase and Sale
Agreement prior you anticipated negotiating with CIT to obtain the release ofits lien.
RESPONSE: Deny.
DATED this j J ^ j W of February, 2006.
WRONA & PARRISH, P.C.

z&
Joseph E. Wrona
Bastiaan K. Coebergh
Tyler S. Foutz
Attorneys for RJW Media, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
of

the

foregoing

SOUTHWESTERN

day of February, 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy

PLAINTIFF'S
TITLE

RESPONSES

AGENCY

OF

TO

UTAH,

DEFENDANT

INC.'S

FIRST

FIRST
SET

OF

INTERROGATORIES, REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, AND
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION to be delivered via first class mail, postage pre-paid, to:
Mark S. Middlemas
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March 10, 2006
VIA FACSIMILE (801) 961-9573
AND FIRST CLASS MAIL
Mark Middlemas
Castle Meinhold & Stawiarski
102 West 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

RJW Media, Inc. v. CIT Group/Consumer Finance, Inc. et al
Supplemental Discovery Requests

Dear Mr, Middlemas:
Pursuant to your letter dated March 6, 2006, Plaintiff RJW Media, Inc.
supplements its Responses to Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc/s
(hereafter "FSWT") First Set of Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents
and Requests for Admission in the following manner:
1.
Plaintiffs Responses have been verified as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 33(b), and
such verification has been mailed to your office.
2.

Plaintiff supplements its response to Interrogatory No. 2 as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO, 2: State the nature of Plaintiffs
business, the number of Plaintiffs employees, and the approximate annual
gross revenue of Plaintiff s business.
RESPONSE: RJ.W. Media, Inc.'s sole business purpose is to
hold real estate. RJ.W. Media, Inc. has no employees, and has no annual
gross revenue.

3.

Plaintiff supplements its response to Interrogatories No. 9, 11, and 12 as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO, 9: Describe in detail any efforts made
by you, S. Blake Parrish, the law firm of Wrona & Parrish, or as any other
party of whom you have knowledge, to "date down" the Property's title at

1
1816 Prospector Avenue, Suite 100

A

Park Gtv, Utah 84060

* P h o n ^ ^ q fjLvw^

A C.

the time S. Blake Parrish became successor trustee on the Indymac Deed
of Trust.
RESPONSE: Blake Parrish obtained a title report on or about
September 9, 2004, which identified the existing Notice of Default issued
by FSWT on or about October 2, 2003.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Describe in detail any efforts
made by you, S. Blake Parrish, the law firm of Wrona & Parrish, or of any
other party of whom you have knowledge, to "date down" the Property's
title after October 28, 2004 and prior to the December 13, 2004
foreclosure sale.
RESPONSE: Mr. Parrish continued to communicate with Park
City Title Company during that time period.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify the title search guarantee,
or any title search document, used by you, S. Blake Parrish, or the law firm
of Wrona & Parrish, to "date down" the Property prior to the December
13, 2004 sale, and identify the date that the document was produced, the
person or entity that produced that document, and the name of any title
insurer or other entity that guaranteed clear title prior to the December 13,
2004 sale.
RESPONSE: See Plaintiffs Response to Interrogatory No. 9,
above.
Plaintiff supplements its response to Interrogatory No. 14 as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Describe what specific conduct by
you, FSWT, or the other parties to the sale made the December 13, 2004
sale valid.
RESPONSE: FSWT, acting in its capacity as Trustee of the
IndyMac Trust Deed and Note, filed a Notice of Default in Summit
County on or about October 2, 2003. Blake Parrish, as successor trustee,
observed the notice of trustee's sale requirements set forth in Section 571-25 of the Utah Code by publication in the Park Record, a publication of
general circulation in Park City, Summit County, State of Utah, posting a
copy of the Notice of Sale on the property in question and posting the
Notice of Sale in the Summit County Recorder's Office. In addition,

2

Blake Parrish sent notice to all individuals holding an interest in the
property, including CIT Group and Alan Squires. The trustee's sale was
conducted by Blake Parrish as trustee in Summit County, Utah on
December 13, 2004.
5.

Plaintiff supplements its response to Request for Production No. 4 as follows:
REQUEST NO, 4: All documents or things identified in, or used
to respond to, Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s
interrogatory number 6.
RESPONSE: Objection. The documents originally provided by
Plaintiff in response to Request No. 4 constitute invoices from Plaintiffs
attorneys. Portions of these invoices contain information protected by the
attorney-client privilege, and therefore all privileged information has been
redacted from the documents. However, Plaintiff asserts that all invoices
for fees provided to FSWT in response to Request No. 4 submitted
constitute fees incurred by Plaintiff as a result of FSWT's actions. See
documents Bates stamped 56 to 61 in Plaintiffs original responses.

6.

Plaintiff supplements its response to Request for Production No. 17 as follows:
REQUEST NO. 17: Please provide a copy of the Special
Warranty Deed, attached and marked as Exhibit H to your Complaint,
showing the recording date and stamp of the county clerk.
RESPONSE: Objection. Proponent is requesting a copy of a
public record. Proponent is capable of obtaining this record, if one exists,
from the Summit County Recorders Office.

7.

Plaintiff supplements its response to Request for Admission No. 1 as follows:
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that you did not mail a copy of the
Assignment of Deed of Trust to FSWT prior to the December 13, 2004
foreclosure sale.
RESPONSE: Deny.

8.
Plaintiff supplements its response to Requests for Admission No. 9 and 14
follows:
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REQUEST NO. 9: Admit that you did not "date down" at the time
S. Blake Parrish became the successor trustee.
RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST NO. 14: Admit that S. Blake Parrish did not "date
down" prior to the December 13,2004 sale.
RESPONSE: Deny.
Dated: March 10, 2006
Wrona & Parrish, P.C.

Z^

Joseph E. Wrona
Tyler S. Foutz
Attorneys for RJW Media, Inc.
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Client: INDYMAC BANK
Firol'SouihvvtstciD Tide Agency of Utah, be.
102 Wtsi 500 Soma Suiic 300
S&i: Lake Chy,UT 84101
CANCELLATION OF NOTICE OF DEFAULT
COMES NOW, First Southwestern Title Agency of Urah, Inc., Successor Trusirc, oi:d
hereby cancels the Notice of Dsfauit, which was recorded on October 3, 2003, £5 Entry-' No.
6756S2r in Bock 1574, ^ t ? ^ c 1559 of Official Records of SUMMIT CCUSTV, S^aic of Urrh
covering the red property iocaicd in SUMMIT County, Sore of urrTi which is described -is
follows:
LOT 5r DUTCH DRAW AT CANYON ESTATES SUBDIVISION, PARK CITY,
UTATL ACCORDING TO THE OFTICJAL PLAT THEREOF ON FILE IN THE
OFFICE OF THE SUMMIT COUNTY RECORDER-

007H5S

Tax Serial No. DDCE-3

47; P - - - £ ^ _ n i ~ - *K.<J-t^.
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DATED September 20, 2004

1

First Southwestern Tlrlt Agency- of Utah. Inc.

BY; _ / J k | i i

1

rr_i_k-j-~- - V ^ ^ ' N -

LORETTA K. ?0CE3 Asst. Vice P r e s i d e 0 SHAUNA M. 3URKE: Asrl. Vic- Fresiacn: or
NANCY BLANCO,. Assi. Vice President
Successor Trustee
STATE OF UTAE
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Or. September 205 2004^ personally appeared before mc: . ; ) p ftU/7_£L ;//' j rjxjt'CMLoi
First Suathwestem Title Agency of Utah, lac. Successor Trustee, who being Erst duly sworn
did acknowledge before me that she is the SUCCBSSOT Trosiee and the signer of the foregoing
CancellaiioD of Notice of De&ult

My Commission Expires;
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - SILVER CREEK
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RJW MEDIA, INC., a Texas
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE CIT GROUP/CONSUMER
FINANCE, INC., a Delaware corporation;
and WESTLAND TITLE INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC., a Utah corporation d/b/a
LINCOLN TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY,
and FIRST SOUTHWESTERN TITLE
AGENCY OF UTAH, INC., a Utah
corporation,

Case No. 050500373

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

AUG - 1 2007

M

SALT LAKE COUNTY

Defendants.

By.

Deputy Cferk

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - ALLOCATION OF FEES
September 18,2006

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - SLANDER OF TITLE
April 16,2007

BEFORE THE HONORABLE BRUCE LUBECK
District Court Judge

Jeri Kearbey
Certified Court Transcriber
\2j)0 Gdylene Circle
Sandy, Utah 840Q4
(801) ^66 4^40

mm7i3

TO:

The Utah Supreme Court
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attention: Pat Bartholomew
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - SILVER CREEK
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RJW MEDIA, INC., a Texas
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE CIT GROUP/CONSUMER
FINANCE, INC., a Delaware corporation;
and WESTLAND TITLE INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC., a Utah corporation d/b/a
LINCOLN TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY,
and FIRST SOUTHWESTERN TITLE
AGENCY OF UTAH, INC., a Utah
corporation,

Case No. 050500373
FILED 0JSTHICT COURT
Third Judicial District

AUG - 1 2007
SALT LAKE COUNTY

Defendants.

By.
Deputy Clerk

Notice is hereby given that on the 26th day of July 2007, transcripts of proceedings held before
The Honorable Bruce Lubeck, District Court Judge, on September 7 and October 31, 2005 and September 18,
2006 and April 16, 2007 in the above case were completed and delivered to the managing reporter at the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DATED this 26th day of July 2007.

JBrrKeartjgy
Certified Court Transcriber
566-4540

Joseph E. Wrona, WLO
Dana T. Farmer, SK
Mark S Middlemas , CM&S
Clerk of the Court
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A P P E A R A N C E S.September 18, 2006
For the Plaintiff:

Joseph E. Wrona
Tyler Foutz
WRONA LAW OFFICES
1816 Prospector Avenue, Suite 100
Park City, Utah 84060

For Defendant CIT and Lincoln Title:

Dana T. Farmer
SMITH KNOWLES, PC
4723 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84403

For Defendant First Southwestern Title:

Mark S. Middlemas
CASTLE, MEINHOLD & STAWIARSKI
102 West 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

April 16f 2007
For the Plaintiff:

Bastiaan Coebergh
WRONA LAW OFFICES
1816 Prospector Avenue, Suite 100
Park City, Utah 84060

For Defendant CIT and Lincoln Title:

Dana T. Farmer
SMITH KNOWLES, PC
4723 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84403

PARK CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2006, 8:59 A.M.
-oooOoooTHE COURT:

Good morning.

We'll call the matter

of RJW Media versus Southwestern Title and others.
case 050500373.

Counsel, state your appearances, please.

MR. WRONA:
RJW Media.

It's

Your Honor, Joseph Wrona on behalf of

Attending with me is Tyler Foutz, one of my

assistants.
MR. FARMER:

Dana Farmer on behalf of defendants,

CIT Group Consumer Finance and Lincoln Title, Your Honor.
MR. MIDDLEMAS:

Mark Middlemas on behalf of First

Southwestern Title Agency.
THE COURT:
today.

All right.

We have three motions

Counsel, I think, in view of the day I have and the

time we've allotted, I think, probably, I'll just want to
hear from you on the summary judgment aspects, motion for
allocation of fees.

And I'll just consider that on the

pleadings, and so, given that there are motions and crossmotions, you really only have about ten minutes each on each
of your motions.
So I think we'll go ahead with the first in time,
which was plaintiff's motion with regard to CIT and hear
you two on that and then here Mr. Wrona and Mr. Middlemas on
the Southwestern Title cross-motions.
I've been through your materials, and, as always,

1 i I'll take it under advisement.
2

r

So,

again, consistent with

what you want to tell me and the time we have, I think I

3 j have a fairly fundamental understanding of the facts.
4

But,

of course, you may want to develop what you think's most

5 j important.
6

But Mr. Wrona, why don't you go ahead and then

7 j I'll hear for you, Mr. Farmer, and then we'll leave that one
8 I and hear from Mr. Wrona and Mr. Middlemas.
9 •

MR. WRONA:

Thank you, Your Honor.

And if it's -

10

the issues really interrelate, and if it's more convenient

11

for the Court from a timing perspective, I think I can

12

probably, in about ten minutes, state my position on

13

virtually the mass of motions.

14

opportunity for rebuttal —

And then if I just have an

15

THE COURT:

Sure.

16

MR. WRONA:

- that would be great.

17

With regard to the two issues as RJW Media sees

18

them, the pertinent facts are undisputed.

First Southwest

19

Title issued a notice of default while Indymac held a note

20

in first position on a particular property.

21

subsequently assigned that note to RJW Media.

22

the assignment, First Southwest Title issued a notice of

23

cancellation.

24

without confirming that the default had been cured, without

25

confirming that the trust deed had been reinstated, and,

Indymac
Subsequent to

Now, they issued that notice of cancellation

1 j obviously, from RJW Media's perspective, most importantly,
2 j without obtaining consent of RJW.
3 |

I think that's sort of the first set of facts

4 | that lead to the initial, you know, legal conclusion, which
5

is that First Southwest Title issued a notice of

6 ' cancellation without doing what it was supposed to do and
7 I that it did not have authorization, legal authorization, to
8

l

issue the notice of cancellation.

i

9 |

Then there's a second group of facts.

After RJW

10 ; obtained the assignment of the note and after RJW had
11 ; confirmed that a notice of cancellation had previously been
12
13

recorded — that a notice of default, excuse me, had
previously been recorded, RJW issued a notice of sale.

14

it did all of the things that the statute requires of RJW

15

Media to alert the world that a foreclosure sale is going to

16 I happen.

And

And it did everything it was supposed to do and it

17 j did it right with regard to actually notifying the world of
18 I the sale.
19 |

It's also- undisputed that RJW specifically

20 | notified CIT of the sale.

And it's also undisputed that CIT

21 | and RJW actually engaged in communication about the sale.
22 I

It's undisputed that CIT chose to remain silent in

23 j its communication with RJW about any perception on CIT's
24 | part of some default in the notice of sale provision.
25 | it's undisputed that CIT chose to ignore the sale.

And

Then

1 I what happened in this case is the sale occurred, RJW Media
2

acquired the property.

CIT then waited several months and

3 , then when the real estate market took off here, CIT decided
i

4 ! to attack RJW's title.
5

That set of facts, I submit, is dispositive to the

6 | claims against CIT and to First Southwest Title.
7

Now, first of all, with regard to CIT.

8

American

9

I'm going to quote from the opinion:

10

Falls

The

case says — and this is — this is language
A mortgager may, by

acquiescence and failure to assert rights at the proper

11 | time, be estopped from attacking the validity of the sale.
The Tim

12 '

case then says:

Irregularities in

13 I technical notice are immaterial unless the objecting party
14

demonstrates that it was unable to protect its rights.
And I think that American

15
16
17

Falls

and Tim when read

together are essentially — well, they're fatal to CIT.
In it's opposition to our summary judgment brief —
i

18 | I mean, I recognize that CIT is trying to distinguish
19

American

Falls

and is trying to portray the facts of

20

American

Falls

as showing that a mortgager was doing over

21 | things, and that set up the estoppel and waiver, and CIT
22 J attempts to portray itself as — as not doing things.
i

23 |

But, I mean, let's be clear that the appellate

i

24 I courts chose the language "acquiescence and failure to
25
assert rights." That phrase very clearly says "doing

nothing is what will set off the estoppel."
And if the Court is ready to parse out the facts
of the two situations, the American Falls

situations and the

CIT situation, I mean, the only really thing — the only
thing that's really different between the two cases is that,
in American

Falls,

the mortgager actually attended the sale

and folded its arms and was quiet.
not to attend the sale.

In this case, CIT chose

And it seems to me that factual

distinction is really no distinction at all.
a mortgagor to escape the law of American

Falls

It would allow
simply by

not attending the sale.

And in — I mean, essentially, it

would just turn American

Falls

into nonsense.

With regard to what the Tim case says about
irregularities being immaterial unless the objecting party
is unable to protect its rights, clearly, CIT was in a
position to protect its rights, knew about the sale, it
could have attended the sale and it could have bid.
Now, CIT, in its brief, raises an argument that
somehow First Southwest Title's wrongful notice of
cancellation had a chilling effect on the sale itself.
again, that argument doesn't make sense to me.

And,

It seems to

me there are two groups of potential purchasers that the
Court needs to look at and assess whether that's a valid
argument or not.

And those two groups are lienholders and

debtors, that's one group.

People such as CIT and — and

people such as the debtor, actually, who was foreclosed upon
in this case.

And then there's that second group which are

third parties at large, the world at large.

Obviously, in a

foreclosure sale, it's to everybody's advantage to sell the
property to the highest bidder.
Now, with regard to the world at large, I think
what's important here is that the notice of the sale itself,
the announcements to the world, running the ads in the
paper, recording the notice of sale, all of that was done
properly.

There has been no criticism about the notice of

the sale.

So the world at large knew about the sale.

If

somebody wanted to bid at the sale, all they had to do was
show up and bid.

The sale was happening.

The only people that really would be potentially
affected by the notice of cancellation would be the original
debtor and, potentially, CIT.

And, yet, it's undisputed

here that CIT knew about the sale, and it's undisputed here
that the original debtor knew about the sale.

So there

really is no legitimate argument that somehow this sale was
chilled.
There's one other interesting fact, Judge.

If in

fact that occurred, given that CIT was in the second
position, a chilling of third-party interest would have
actually worked to CIT's benefit; they would have been able
to buy the property more cheaply.

In a bidding war, if the

price had gone up, if CIT wanted to pony up and take the
property, they would have had to spend more.

So, you know,

what we have here, I think, is a situation where
Falls

American

and Tim both state that, given these facts, CIT's

claims just simply cannot survive summary judgment.
Now, with regard to First Southwest Title, it
seems to me there are two — two legal issues that have to be
addressed.

One is the standard of care.

that First Southwest Title is a trustee.
care exists as a matter of law.

It's undisputed
So the standard of

I just don't think there's

any court, at least in this state, probably in the United
States that's going to take the position that a trustee does
not owe a duty.
And in this case that standard is defined by
statute.

What a trustee must do before it can issue a

notice of cancellation properly is it has to show that the
default has been cured and it has to show that the trustee
has been reinstated.

There's some debate in the briefing of

the parties as to who the duty of care is owed to by First
Southwest Title, whether it's owed to, for instance, RJW or
whether it's owed to everybody out there.
feeling — well, strike that.

And I have a

I stated that clumsy.

The interesting thing, if it's owed to the world
at large, RJW is a subset of the world at large; the duty is
clearly owed to RJW.

So no matter who the duty is owed to,

1 • it includes RJW.

And in this case, the duty wasn't — the

2 | duty was not followed, the duty was breached.
3 ; cured.

The trust deed was not reinstated.

It was not

And, you know,

4 j most importantly from RJW's perspective the notice of
5 ! cancellation was issued without RJW's consent.
6 \

When CIT attacked the title to the property — and

7 j it wasn't attacked on title.

Once CIT said, "We think we're

8 ; entitled to take that property.

We think we're entitled to

9 j notice up a foreclosure sale," that's a cloud on title.
10

that point, that interferes with RJW's ability to do

11

anything with the property.

At

And the law says that, you

12 | know, attorney fees are appropriate damages in that case.
13 | And they are, from an equitable perspective, Judge, they're
14 j appropriate in this case.
15

RJW bought the property.

16 | before the sale.

RJW tried to talk to CIT

RJW didn't want this lawsuit.

17

the aggressor in this situation.

18

to come to court and to engage in a — in a lot of

19 I litigation.

RJW was not

I mean, RJW's been forced

This is the briefing just, you know, that's
So,

20 i before the Court today just to protect its own title.

21 I you know, I think that's another important consideration
22 I with regard to First Southwest Title.
23 |

And I almost honored my commitment, Judge.

Over

24 j by a couple minutes.

But those are my opening remarks.

25 I

Thank you.

THE COURT:

And let me hear, then,

10

from Mr. Farmer and then from Mr. Middlemas.
Mr. Farmer?
MR. FARMER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, we're here as a follow-up to a pending
preliminary injunction on the enforcement of the trustee
foreclosure on CIT's note, which, undisputedly was a second
position note behind that of the note purchased by RJW
Media.

And as to their motion for summary judgment filed by

RJW Media, they indicate that:

"RJW has been damaged in its
this

action

just

for these reasons

and other damages, this

memorandum in support
herewith.

costs

set forth
of this

RJW moves that

bringing

Court deems

more fully

motion

this

in

Finance

against

defendant,

the

filed

Court grant

motion for summary judgment with respect
claims

in

the
to RJW's

the CIT Group, Consumer

Incorporated."

As I read that, I don't see specific relief; I see
that there's an allegation of some sort of damages.
Referring over to the ninth page of their motion for summary
judgment, in their point 4, saying summary judgment is
appropriate, they state that all the material facts are
established to prove that CIT has waived any right to
challenge the trustee sale and that CIT is estopped from
contesting the validity of the sale.

And then again, down in the conclusion, "These
facts establish as a matter of law that CIT has waived its
right to contest the sale and that CIT should be estopped
from contesting the sale," and then restating an indication
of damages which are not quantified.
Now, Your Honor, these are both equitable
remedies, and in the complaint, RJW Media sets forth three
causes of action against CIT.

One is declaratory relief

seeking a determination from this Court that we've waived
rights and that we're estopped from enforcing our note and
trust deed.
The second one is a declaratory judgment seeking
permanent injunction.
The third is a sign or title claim also seeking a
permanent injunction.
So we're on a preliminary injunction now, but as
we sit on summary judgment based upon the documents that are
before the Court, they're not asking for a permanent
injunction, which is their legal remedy.

Instead, we're

asking for equitable remedies based upon the principles of
waiver of estoppel.

And, Your Honor, we don't get two

equitable remedies unless we've exhausted our legal
remedies.

The legal remedy available to RJW Media is a

proper foreclosure of its trust deed.
Now, RJW Media takes a position that they properly

12

1 i foreclosed their trust deed by giving notice of the sale to
all the world.

2

The problem, Your Honor, is that that sale

I

3 , was undisbutably held based upon a canceled notice of the
4

deed of — or the canceled notice of default.

5

notice of default was recorded in the Summit County

6 J Recorder's Office.

The canceled

As we've indicated in the briefing, RJW

7

is asserting that they have the right to rely upon a

8

separate notice system from that prescribed by the statutes

9 i of the state, specifically those relating to trust deed
10

foreclosure.

Unlike mortgage foreclosure, this is not a

11

judicial process.

12

a common law based type of a procedure, Your Honor, this is

13

purely a statutory procedure.

This is a non-judicial process.

It's not

14

Statutory procedures are strict.

Statutory

15

procedures, like foreclosure of trust deeds, require

16

compliance with the provisions in the statute so the people

17

who have interest in the property can properly make

18

decisions as to the relative rights that they have with the

19

claims on title.

20

sets forth that the trustee does not have the authority to

21

conduct a trustee's sale until they first record the notice

22

of default.

23

the trust deed does not have any statutory authority to

24

conduct a sale.

That's why the trust deed statute clearly

Without the notice of default on the record,

In this case, the notice of default was

25 I canceled on September 22nd, 2004, Your Honor, and a sale was

held on December 13th, 2004.
RJW says, "Well, that's of no consequence, Your
Honor, because we let CIT know that we were going to go
ahead with the sale and we published the notice of that
sale."
The problem with that argument is this, Your
Honor:

What is CIT supposed to rely upon?

Is CIT supposed

to rely upon the representations of RJW's attorney that it's
going to have a sale and it considers the sale valid?

Or is

CIT entitled to rely upon the record at the Summit County
Recorder's Office?
According to the Summit County, the location where
all documents relating to foreclosure sale are supposed to
be recorded for public review;
been canceled.

this notice of default has

And even if they have a sale, it's an

invalid sale, because the authority is not there for the
trustee to conduct the sale.

That, Your Honor, is the

reasonable conclusion, because this is a race-to-notice
state.
If I give you — if I sell you my property, Your
Honor, if I quitclaim my property to you by deed today and I
quitclaim my property by deed to Mr. Middlemas tomorrow, if
he records before you record, he owns my property.

Because

under the race notice policy of this state, he was the first
one to have his document recorded at the recorder's office.

14

1 ,

We can't ignore the significance of the record at

2 J the Summit County Recorder's Office when evaluating the
3 | relative rights of the parties in this case.

The record

4 | there was clear; the notice of default had been canceled.
5

It's also clear from the trustee foreclosure
i

6 I statute that notices with respect to the foreclosure of
7 » trust deeds are to be recorded at the recorder's office.
8

You must record your notice of default.

9

must record your cancellation of the notice of default.

10 j Why?

If you cancel, you

So that people with an interest in the property have

11 i notice of what's going on and can make a decision.
12
13

RJW asserts that that process can be ignored and
that a separate process which is not spelled out in the

14 j statute can be applied to include that CIT has waived its
15 I rights, because they had actual notice.

That, despite the

16

deficiencies in the public record, RJW Media was going to

17

conduct a sale anyway.

18

So on that basis, Your Honor, it seems to me clear

19

that on December 13th, 2004, when Mr. Parrish conducted his

20

foreclosure sale, he was without authority as the trustee

21 I because there had been a cancellation of the notice of
22

default.

23

Now, getting back to the waiver argument, Your

24

Honor, as we come here today with RJW arguing waiver and

25 i estoppel, waiver, by definition, is the voluntary

15

relinquishment of a known right.

The only right that CIT

had in this property was a second position deed of trust.
So if RJW Media wants to rely upon waiver for the basis of
precluding us from enforcing our deed of trust, it is an
absolute prerequisite that they establish that we had some
legal right to enforce.

The only legal right we could

potentially have is our second-position trust deed.
If their sale was valid, Your Honor, we donft have
a deed of trust; it was eliminated with the sale in December
of '04.

So if they1re arguing waiver to the Court, they

must concede that their sale was invalid.

That's the only

way that we have a legal right to waive.

We can only still

have a deed of trust on the property, Your Honor, if there
was no valid foreclosure sale to begin with.
Now, as to estoppel, estoppel requires that they
show some sort of detrimental reliance upon some
representation or upon some lack of representation that we
should have made.

And they rely upon the American

Falls

case and upon the Tim case for these arguments, Your Honor.
CIT's position is simply this:
record.

CIT looked at the

CIT received — excuse me, I'll back up.
CIT received correspondence from RJW indicating

that RJW Media was going to proceed with a sale in December.
CIT also had the public record which said that the notice of
default which Indymac had originally reported, had been

16

canceled by First Southwestern Title.
make in that situation.

CIT has a choice to

Does CIT rely upon what's coming to

it from RJW's attorney or do they rely upon the record?

I

think it's clear that they are entitled to rely upon the
record, Your Honor.
But do they have to communicate their intention to
RJW Media?
Honor.

I think the answer is, very clearly, no, Your

RJW Media is perfectly capable of searching title

and determining the status of the notice of default.

In the

affidavit of Mr. Smith, which is — which is with the
briefing, Your Honor, it clearly lays out that the proper
procedure for conducting a foreclosure sale is to do a title
search initially and then to do what's called a datedown,
which is, 3 0 days before the sale, you search the title
again to determine — sorry — tax liens from the IRS and so
forth, Your Honor.
There was no title searching done by RJW Media.
RJW Media takes the position that "we can come in, we can
assume we've got a valid notice of default, we can send out
a sale, we can tell people in letters, which are not
provided for in statute, that we're going to have a sale.
We can ignore what's on the title and we can have our sale,
and it's not going — and it's going to be a valid sale, even
though there was a canceled notice of default."
If they would have checked title, Your Honor,

which a reasonable trustee would have done, they would have
seen that the notice of default had been canceled, they
could have recorded a new notice of default, noticed up the
sale and had a perfectly valid sale.

They didn't do that.

It's not our obligation to tell them how to do
their job.

So I don't think that they can say that they

7 I reasonably relied upon CIT's silence when they didn't even
go and search title themselves.

They're deemed to have

knowledge of the canceled deed of trust, Your Honor, yet
they want us to tell them that we're going to rely upon the
deed of trust and not attend your sale.
At what point does RJW have responsibility to act
as a reasonable trustee, Your Honor, and not come into this
court and say, "These guys have just ganged up on us and
come in and making all these claims when we gave the whole
world the notice that we were supposed to give by noticing
up the sale," when they lacked the prerequisite valid notice
of default, Your Honor?
Finally, Your Honor, with respect to the chilling
of the bidding, and then I'll conclude.
The case law in chilling of the bidding is very
simple.

We don't have to prove that the bidding was chilled

in fact; we have to choose the possibility — prove that it
could have been chilled.

That's the standard from the case

law.
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Mr. Wrona indicated that the cancellation of title
really only affected those people who had some sort of a
note on title, like CIT or First Southwestern Title and
others.

I disagree, Your Honor.
If someone is going to go to a foreclosure sale

and they are going to purchase property at foreclosure, they
purchase the property without warranty.
warranties in the trustee's deed.

There are no

So if I'm going to buy at

a foreclosure sale and if I want to have valid title to that
property, it is imperative that I determine that the trustee
foreclosure procedure has been followed and that the money I
spend is spent on quality title.

Because if I don't buy

quality title, the trustor, the person who's in default, can
come back and get it from me, alleging deficiencies in the
sale.
A second-position lienholder, such as CIT in this
case, can come in and invalidate the sale.

And if I bought

title based upon a canceled notice of default or a sale with
no notice of default at all, I don't have any warranties
from the trustee that I can rely upon; I've lost title to
the property.

So it's only reasonable to conclude that

anyone who had an interest in purchasing the property and in
bidding at this sale would conduct at least a brief search
of title down in Coalville.

And it's also reasonable to

conclude that person, or persons, would see the cancellation
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1

of the notice of default that can raise ques tions as to the

2

validilty of the sale, which we are here discussing today,

3

and as the — and it could chill the bidding, which is the

4

standard, Your Honor.

5 i

i

Unless the Court has any questions.

i

6 |

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Farmer.

I think I

7 J understand your position.
8

Mr. Middlemas for Southwest Title?

9

MR. MIDDLEMAS:

10

Thank you, Your Honor.

In response to RJW Media's motion for summary

11

judgment, we would ask that it would be denied because there

12

are genuine issues of material fact in dispute, specifically

13

as to the reasonableness of First Southwest's action in this

14

matter.

15

assignment of trust deed, their notice concerning the change

16

of beneficiaries, and, of course, whether or not RJW had any

Specifically, their notice concerning the

17 , actual — has any actual damages.
18

In addition, there are

questions as to the industry standards and customs.

19 |

These factual disputes, Your Honor, arise in part

20 I from the affidavits of two seasoned foreclosure
21 | practitioners which were submitted by First Southwest Title
22 | and which RJW - to which RJW has failed to file any counter23 | affidavits as to the issues of standard of industry evidence
24 ! and care.

Those affidavits show that First Southwest Title

25 | acted within the confines of the custom and standards of the

20

1 I industry and, in fact, that RJW's attorney and trustee,
2

Blake Parrish, failed to act reasonably.

3
4

Now, Your Honor, as no counter-affidavits have
been filed, RJW cannot simply rely on its unsupported

5 | averment at this stage to obtain summary judgment, and the
6 j Court may deny RJW's motion simply because they have failed
7

to establish genuine issues of material fact by responsive

8

affidavits.

9 I

Your Honor, obviously, First Southwest Title is

10

seeking dismissal in the form of — through their cross-

11

motion for summary judgment, and our argument is fairly

12

simpLe.

13

prove all of the elements of its cause of action and there

14

are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute, then

15

their motion for summary judgment must be denied and First

16

Southwest Title's motion for summary judgment must be

17

granted.

18

If First Southwest — or RJW Media is unable to

What are the elements?

Well, Mr. Wrona has stated

19

some of those elements.

They must prove that there was a

20

duty running between First Southwest Title and RJW Media,

21

they must show that there was a breach of that duty by First

22 j Southwest Title that recorded the cancellation of notice of
23

default, and they must show that there were actual damages

24

suffered as a result of that breach.

25

I'm going to focus my arguments on the issues of

21

1

breach and damages because it is our contention that they

2 , simply cannot prove those elements under the undisputed
3

facts as they stand.

4 I

As to the issue of breach, RJW cannot prove breach

5

because under the undisputed facts concerning industry

6

standard, custom and care, First Southwest Title acted

7 | reasonably.
8

Now, RJW has argued two standards here.

9

One,

they've argued the statutory standard, which is that the

10 ' cancellation could only be recorded once the default is
11 j cured and reinstated.

And we'll talk about that in a minute

12 ! because that — that's not quite right.

In addition, they've

stated that there was a standard of reasonable care for a

13
i

14 ( trustee.
s

Thus,

(inaudible) the standard submitted by RJW,

15 | if First Southwest Title acted reasonably — and this is, of
16

course, in light of industry standard and custom and the

17 ' circumstances, under the case law submitted in the briefs,
18 | the question becomes:

Did First Southwest Title act

!

19 | reasonably when it reported the cancellation of notice of
20

default?

Did it act as any trustee would under the

21

circumstances?

And, of course, we're saying — we would urge

22 ! the Court that, under the undisputed facts, they did.
23 j Southwest And
take have
a look
the circumstances.
Titlelet's
did not
any at
notice
of the change ofFirst
24
25

beneficiaries or the assignment of trust deed.

This is

22

1 , undisputed.

It's undisputed that RJW did not send a copy of

i
2

the assignment of trust deed to First Southwest Title.

3

undisputed they didn't send them a copy of the note,

It's

4 !i| purchase and sale agreement, or communicate with them in any
5

way.
It is further undisputed that they did not receive

6
7

notice in the form of the original time stamped copy.

Now,

8

this has been an issue in the — in the briefs, but it's come

9

to light that RJW does not actually argue that First

10

Southwest Title received that original recorded document,

11

only that RJW did not receive it.

12

has not disputed the records of the county recorder which

13

clearly show that the assignment was mailed to Wrona and

14

Parrish.

And they have not — RJW

First Southwest Title simply did not have notice

15
16

of this - this change.

17

that - that we should have - that First Southwest Title

18

shouLd have obtained authorization from RJW.

19

notice.

20

they were the new trustee.

21

So, consequently, they're arguing

They have no

They didn't know that RJW existed let alone that

More importantly, because they didn't have notice

22

of the change of beneficiaries, when they received

23

instructions to record this cancellation of notice of

24

default from Indymac Bank's attorneys, they had no reason to

25

question Indymac's authority or to question whether or not

23

Indymac was still the beneficiary.
to question this.

There was no reason to —

And this is absolutely consistent with

industry standards.
In the affidavit submitted to the Court from
Melvin Smith and Kathy Davis, both seasoned foreclosure
practitioners, it is neither industry custom or standard for
a trustee to question a purported beneficiary when its
received instructions to record a cancellation absent some
notice that would — that would give them some indication
that that would be incorrect.
First Southwest Title did not obtain a title
report before reporting the cancellation because, again, not
the industry standard to do so.

RJW has not disputed these

industry standards.
First Southwest Title acted as any other
reasonable trustee would, considering they had no notice of
the change.

They did not breach their duty.

Now, let's take a look at the statute, too.

First

Southwest's actions were reasonable in light of the statute
which does not expressly state that they must seek the
authority or the consent of the beneficiary.
say that, Your Honor.

It does not

Nor does it provide a remedy in the

statute for when that consent is not obtained or for when a
notice of cancellation is recorded — or a cancellation is
recorded in error.

24

Now, the statute says that it — they've emphasized
that the statute says that a cancellation may only be
recorded once the default is cured.
true in the commercial practice.

But that's clearly not

For instance, if a notice

of default is recorded on a property and it's recorded on
the wrong property — for instance, they had the wrong legal
description or a bad address — you've got to cancel that
notice of default.

Well, clearly, the underlying default

hasn't been cured, but you didn't violate the statute
because you removed that — because you canceled that notice.
And this, Your Honor — it's interesting.

It does

not appear to be an oversight in the statute, where it
states that there is no official — where there is no
direction to seek authority.

There are other statutes in

that same chapter that specifically require the trustee to
seek the beneficiary's approval; for instance, on deeds of
reconveyance.

And those statutes also provide extensive

remedies for failing to do so.

Those directions and

remedies are simply absent in Utah Code Annotated 57-1-31,
the applicable statute.
It must be emphasized here, too, Your Honor, the
statute certainly does not impose strict liability.

And the

mere fact that First Southwest Title recorded the
cancellation is not in itself evidence of breach.

In fact,

the courts have rejected imposing strict liability simply

25

because the trustee has acted without the authority of a
beneficiary.

It's from the Wycalus

case.

Obviously, Your Honor, since First Southwest Title
had no knowledge of RJW nor of the change of the
beneficiaries, they couldn't seek their authority and they
had no reason to question the authority of Deutsche.

They

did not breach their duty because they acted within the
industry standards.
Your Honor, it's also important to note that,
throughout this litigation, RJW has actually argued that
their sale is valid; despite the cancellation, they sale is
valid.

In fact, they've argued here today the Tim case in

support of their argument that the notice — the cancellation
is simply a — is immaterial to the validity of the sale, it
was a technical defect.
If the sale, then, was valid, then the
cancellation had no actual effect on the sale or RJW's
rights.

RJW was able to foreclose the property and convey

the property.

If the sale is valid, then RJW accomplished

the purposes of the trustee's sale.

That means that the

trustee's duty was fulfilled and it cannot — and First
Southwest Title cannot have breached its duty.
Well, Your Honor, even if the sale is deemed
invalid here today, for the reasons expressed earlier, First
Southwest Title still acted reasonably, given the

1

circumstances and the industry custom.

2

Now, let's take a look at the issue of damages.

3 j It's the third cause — the third element of the cause of
4 i action that they simply cannot prove.
5 ;

It is undisputed that RJW's damages are non-

6 ! recoverable because the only damages that they are arguing,
7

the only ones that they've articulated, are attorneys fees

8

incurred in bringing this litigation here.

9

law and the undisputed facts, RJW is barred from obtaining

Now, under Utah

10

these attorneys fees.

11

rule which states that you cannot obtain attorneys fees

12

unless you have a contractual or statutory right.

13

not disputed this and there's no evidence of a contract or a

14

statutory right.

15

First of all, we have the American

They have

There's also the — there's also Utah's economic

16

loss rule, which states that, in cases of negligence — and

17

in the White

18

cases are treated as negligence cases — that a party may not

Palace

case, we learned that breach of duty

19 I obtain damages purely for economic loss.
20

Now, Your Honor, having remained silent on the

21

American rule and the economic loss rule, they turned to

22

their — their last bastion here of safety, and that is

23 I trying to obtain these attorneys fees through
24 I Planned
25

Management

Services,

Bass

v.

stating that they can obtain

these special damages for trying — for attempting to remove

27

a cloud on title.
Your Honor, this line of cases, Dowse v.

Trust,

Misco,

these cases

Bass v. Planned
present

Management

some serious

Services,

Doris

all of

problems for — for RJW, and

here's why:
First of all, a cancellation of notice of default
is not a cloud on title.
authority for that.

They have not presented any

It does not fit into any of the

categories found in the case law, it's not a deed, a vesting
instrument, it's not a claim for adverse interest or a lien.
If there is a cloud on title, it would be CIT's
notice of default, which is an instrument that was recorded
challenging their right to possession while they are in
possession.

And that's important here, Your Honor.

When

this notice of — when the cancellation was recorded, RJW
wasn't actually in possession of the property yet.
Planned

Management

Services,

Bass

v.

the court actually denied those

attorneys fees as special damages because the defendants
were not — or because the plaintiffs were not in possession
of the property.
RJW has not filed suit against First Southwest
Title to actually remove the cloud on title.
asked for damages.

They've only

Your Honor, if they prevail on their

cause of action, it's not going to do anything to the
cancellation of notice of default.

It's not going to cure
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this cloud.
More importantly, and this is — this is the string
that runs through all of those cases.

Attorneys fees as

special damages are only awarded in cases where, in addition
to the successful action for cloud on title, they're also
able to prove slander of title.
action.

It's a separate cause of

Plaintiff must show — and this — again, in all of

these cases it's the same, those special damages are granted
because there was also a slander of title.
Now, in this matter, RJW's slander of title action
against First Southwest was voluntarily dismissed almost a
year ago, on November 1st, 2005.

They cannot prove a — they

cannot and have not even attempted, really, to prove a
slander of title action.

Therefore, they cannot obtain

those special damages that would be awarded as a result of
that slander of title action.
In short, their attorneys fees are barred by the
American rule, the economic loss rule and by this line of
cases.

If attorneys fees are their only, damages and they

have no way to recover those damages, they cannot prove the
third element of their cause of action.
Now, Your Honor, we have to state that, if there
are any damages here — and this — this presents a genuine
issue of material fact in opposition to their motion for
summary judgment. If there are any damages here, they are a
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result of the intervening failures of their attorney and
trustee, Blake Parrish.

Mr. Parrish, as trustee, took RJW

Media to sale on a canceled notice of default.

It's

undisputed from the depositions, it's undisputed from the
facts before the Court that he did not do a datedown, as —
as Mr. Farmer explained, he did not update their title, he
did not check it at the crucial junctures in which that
needed to occur.

Frankly, when it came to sale, he didn't

know there was a cancellation.

Mr. Parrish was in a

position to prevent this litigation.
to prevent the damages.

He was in a position

All he had to do was check the

title and fix the problem.
It is not equitable, Your Honor, to award
attorneys fees to RJW Media when their own attorney and
trustee, through his own intervening failures, caused any
damages that they could allege.
Again, Your Honor, RJW has continually argued that
the sale is valid.

If the sale is valid, then they were

able to accomplish their goals and they simply have no
damages.

Their second and third causes of action are — are

undisputed and unprovable.
Your Honor, very quickly, just while we have a
moment left, the Court also has a July 28th, 2004 note and
purchase sale agreement before it.

It's Exhibit A here.

The Court has it in the briefings.

But what I would just
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like to say very quickly is that that — there's an
indemnification agreement there which states that RJW agreed
to hold harmless all agents of Indymac Bank.

It's our

contention that First Southwest Title was acting as an
agent.

Actually, Mr. Parrish, in his deposition, agreed

with us that a — that a trustee does act as an agent.

This

is exactly the sort of problem, this cancellation of notice
of default caused by the confusion is exactly the kind of
problem that would be anticipated in an indemnification
agreement that a seller would want to protect its agents and
subagents against.
In addition, it also states in that
indemnification agreement that attorneys fees and costs must
be denied or, more importantly, that they should be held
harmless.

Consequently, Your Honor, we believe that that,

too, is a bar to their ability to obtain attorneys fees.
In conclusion, Your Honor, the facts are
undisputed here First Southwest Title did not have notice,
First Southwest Title was not in position to do — to get the
authorization.

In addition, they followed the industry

standard of care.

Those facts are absolutely undisputed.

The affidavits are there and they're uncontroverted.

And we

would ask the Court, then, to deny their motion for summary
judgment and grant First Southwest Title's.
Does the Court have any questions?
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THE COURT:

No.

MR. MIDDLEMAS:

Thank you.
Thank you.

THE COURT:

Mr. Wrona?

MR. WRONA:

Your Honor, with regard to CIT's

arguments, I think I just want to respond very, very simply.
If an unauthorized cancellation is capable of
destroying an otherwise properly noticed foreclosure sale,
then it would be the case that a sale could be knocked out
virtually every time somebody records a notice of
cancellation.
There's no difference in this case between First
Southwest Title recording a notice of cancellation and
somebody from the street walking into the recorder's office
and recording a notice of cancellation.

The fact of the

matter is First Southwest Title was not authorized to file
the notice of cancellation when it did so.

I mean, it

really is just that simple.
With regard to First Southwest Title, seems to me
their — their arguments today were twofold.
breach and then they challenged damages.

They challenged

First Southwest

Title attempts to invoke an industry standard and they make
the argument, "Look, we have demonstrated an industry
standard," and it then becomes incumbent upon RJW Media to
sort of present a counter-industry standard, and then we're
going to have a battle of experts at a trial, I guess.

And
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there are certain types of cases where we have battles of
experts about, you know, for instance, whether malpractice
occurs.

But an affidavit of industry standard cannot

overcome a legal duty or a statutorily imposed duty.

When

the law says you must do X, you must do Y, you must do Z, an
affidavit from somebody saying, "We don't do that; we've
never really done that," that does not create a reasonable
dispute of fact.
So, if in fact we have a clearly articulated legal
standard, frankly, you know, a hundred affidavits from a
hundred experts cannot overcome that legal duty.
The other thing I noticed in First Southwest
Title's arguments, it's attempting to shift the burden.
Southwest Title wants to contend that, gee, it didn't have
any reason to ask whether it was proper to issue the
cancellation.

And First Southwest Title also argues that

RJW was supposed to do all of these things that it didn't
do, like, you know, notify First Southwest Title.

But I

just want to remind the Court, First Southwest Title was the
trustee, RJW Media was the beneficiary.

The duty flows one

way, it doesn't flow both ways.
First Southwest Title had an affirmative duty; RJW
Media did not have a duty.

First Southwest Title had a

duty, as a trustee, and it breached that duty.

The fact

that First Southwest Title, you know, was put in a position
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where it has to come into court and attempt to shift the
burden demonstrates the weakness of its arguments.

The

argument that, "Gee, this is what we do in the industry all
the time,,f that just simply does not overcome the undisputed
facts and the law that are present in this case.

In fact,

you know, if we were probably to sit here and think about
it, we could come up with a lot of negligence cases that
resulted in substantial jury awards where the excuse was,
"We do it all the time."
Now, with regard to the argument that the validity
of the sale, I think I heard First Southwest Title say,
"Look, they're taking the position the sale was valid.

And

if the sale was valid, RJW Media couldn't have been damaged
by the cancellation notice."

Well, the sale was valid, but

we still have all of this damage.

I mean, it's there in

black and white.
First Southwest Title invokes the economic loss
rule, and that's a red herring as well.

I've done a lot of

litigation with the economic loss rule.

An economic loss

rule was stated in American
American

Towers,

Towers

and in the progeny of

And what the economic loss rule states is

that in situations of general negligence, tort damages won't
be allowed if there was a contract in place between parties,
unless there was an independent duty.

That's the

caveat: unless there was an independent duty.

If that
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caveat didn't exist — and it's been set forth by the courts
repeatedly — that would let lawyers off the hook
unilaterally and, think about it, in legal malpractice,
because you sue for malpractice, that's a tort; you'd be
able to invoke the economic loss rule and the — you know,
the Lawyers in this state would be holding a party if that
was the case.
So the question here is:

Is there an independent

duty?

They're a trustee; clearly, there is an independent

duty.

So the economic loss rule doesn't apply.
They raised an argument that, somehow, Blake

ParrLsh was an intervening cause.

And it f s interesting

because it seems to me their argument's defeated by their
own earlier attempt to use an affidavit of industry
standard.

You know, whether — First Southwest Title is a

title company and wants to take the position, "Gee, this is
what lawyers are supposed to do," you know, the fact of the
matter is there is no affirmative duty on Blake Parrish,
who — pretty good lawyer and a very honest lawyer.

I mean,

and — and I have to concede, one of my closest personal
friends.

Even though he and I don't practice together

anymore, we talk every week.
Blake Parrish, when he took over the assignment of
the note, confirmed that there was a notice of default on
the record.

And First Southwest Title wants to say that,
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1

you know, "Gee, it was Blake Parrish1s job to datedown

2

title, to datedown title."

3

day?

4

I mean, what, every week?

Every

Up until ten minutes before the sale?
When Blake Parrish had done all of the things that

5 ' an attorney in his p o s i t i o n normally does, Mr. Parrish did
6

not have some affirmative duty.

7

cause here.

8
9

He was not an intervening

And then, finally, now, with regard to this
indemnification, First Southwest Title overlooks one thing.

10

It was no longer an agent when it issued that notice of

11

cancellation.

12

That's the whole point here.

So that indemnification, yes, when that document

13

was signed, they were relieved of liability from anything

14

they had done prior to signing that document.

15

not relieved prospectively.

16

is to take the type of indemnification language that we

17

commonly see in these types of agreements, and they want to

18

use that as somehow a blanket indemnification for anything

19

they did in the future.

20

taking this property and we're agreeing to hold agents of

21

you harmless for the things they have done."

22

those same people to go out and prospectively breach their

23

duties and then invoke the indemnification clause.

24
25

But they were

What they're attempting to do

Something that says, "Okay, we're

Doesn't allow

So, you know, the indemnification argument, the
economic loss rule argument, the validity of sale, the
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intervening cause, I mean, you know, First Southwest Title,
we could see just by the cards they're throwing out one
after the other after the other after the other demonstrates
the weakness of their position.

They don't really have a

powerful argument.
You know, with regard to the damages, you know, my
client's incurred a lot of attorney fees and it didn't need
to in this case.

I think the Court understands — and I

agree, you know, the way to handle the actual damage
argument is subsequent to this hearing.

I mean, the courts

traditionally handle that through attorney fee affidavits,
which, you know, we're happy to do.

It's a painful

exercise, but I realize that's just part of our job.
Those are my comments, Judge.
THE COURT:

All right.

appreciate your arguments.
the materials.

Thank you, counsel.

I

Again, I've — I've been through

I'll do it again with some care and go over

these arguments and get out a ruling soon.
MR. MIDDLEMAS:

Your Honor, can I give the Court -

can I give the Court one citation?
THE COURT:

Not in your pleadings?

MR. MIDDLEMAS:

No, Your Honor.

It was -

Mr. Wrona stated that anyone could record a cancellation.
Title 57, Chapter 1, Section 31 sets forth that to — it sets
forth the form and that the cancellation may be filed by the
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1

trustee and must be signed by the trustee.

2

Title was the trustee at the time of the cancellation.

3

THE COURT:

4

(Whereupon, at 9:50 a.m. , the

5
6

All right.

First Southwest

Thank you, counsel.

h e a r i n g was concluded.)
-oooOooo-
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Tab I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RJW MEDIA, INC., a Texas
corporation,

RULING and ORDER

Plaintiff,
Case No. 050500373
vs.
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
THE CIT GROUP/CONSUMER
FINANCE, INC., a Delaware
corporation; WESTLAND TITLE
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., a Utah
corporation, d/b/a
LINCOLN TITLE INSURANCE
AGENCY; and FIRST SOUTHWESTERN
TITLE AGENCY OF UTAH, INC., a
Utah corporation,

DATE: September 22, 2006

Defendants.

The above matter came before the Court on September 18, 2006
for oral argument on several motions.
Plaintiff was present through Joseph E. Wrong/Tyler S.
Foutz, defendants CIT Group and Westland Title were present
through Dana T. Farmer, and First Southwestern Title was present
through Mark S. Middlemas.
The following motions were considered:

1. Plaintiff RJW Media, Inc.'s ("RJW" or "Plaintiff") motion
-1-
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for summary judgment and Defendant The CIT Group/Consumer
Finance, Inc.'s ("CIT" or "Defendant") cross-motion for summary
judgment;
Plaintiff filed this motion for summary judgment on May 5,
2006 and CIT filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on May 31,
2006.

CIT filed an opposition response on May 31, 2006 and

Plaintiff filed an opposition response on June 9, 2006.
Plaintiff filed a reply on June 2, 2006 and CIT filed a reply on
June 21, 2006.

A request to submit was filed by Plaintiff on

July 7, 2006 and by CIT on August 10, 2006.

2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and Southwestern
Title's cross motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff filed this motion for summary judgment on May 5,
2006 and Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on
May 25, 2006.

Defendant filed an opposition response on May 25,

2006 and Plaintiff filed an opposition response on June 12, 2006.
Plaintiff filed a reply on June 7, 2006 and Defendant filed a
reply on June 22, 2006.

A request to submit was filed by

Plaintiff on July 7, 2006 and by Defendant on July 18, 2006.
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3. Southwestern Title's motion for allocation of fees.
Southwestern Title filed this motion July 21, 2006.
Plaintiff filed an opposition response August 4, 2006.
Southwestern Title filed a reply and request to submit August 11,
2006.

Oral argument was scheduled and held on September 18, 2006.
The Court took the matter under advisement.
The Court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the
entire file, heard oral argument, and concludes as follows.

1. PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GIT'S

CROSS MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

BACKGROUND
It appears to the Court that the following facts are
undisputed.

On January 24, 2001, certain property in Park City

(the "Property") was encumbered by a deed of trust ("IndyMac
Trust Deed") executed in favor of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B.
("IndyMac").

Subsequently, the Property was encumbered by a
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second deed of trust executed in favor of CIT.

In July 2004,

IndyMac assigned its note relating to the Property to RJW.

RJW

thereafter performed a title search on the Property and
discovered a Notice of Default had been recorded.

Soon after,

First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah/ the trustee of the
IndyMac Trust Deed, issued a Cancellation of Notice of Default
("Cancellation of Default").

RJW did not become aware that a

Cancellation of Default had been filed until after it had
foreclosed on the Property.

CIT, however, became aware of the

Cancellation of Default on November 9, 2004.
On November 12, 2004, Blake Parrish, the new trustee of the
IndyMac Trust Deed, issued a Notice of Trustee's Sale of the
Property ("Notice of Sale").

The Notice of Sale complied with

all statutory requirements and stated that the Property would be
sold at the Summit County Courthouse on December 13, 2004 at
11:00 a.m.
On November 16, 2004, RJW mailed notice of the sale
("Trustee's Sale") to CIT.

Two days later, RJW mailed another

letter to CIT informing it that the Trustee's Sale was noticed
for December 13, 2004 and that RJW was willing to purchase CIT's
trust deed in advance of the sale.

RJW indicated in the letter
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that it intended to conduct the foreclosure sale and clean off
all encumbrances to the Property.
CIT received the Notice of Sale and offer from RJW to
purchase its trust deed, but CIT never responded to R J W s letter
and never informed RJW about the Cancellation of Default or that
CIT believed the impending Trustee's Sale would be invalid.

On

December 13, 2004, the Trustee's Sale was conducted in accordance
with the Notice of Sale.

CIT did not attend the Trustee's Sale

and RWJ purchased the Property as the highest bidder.
Following the Trustee's Sale, CIT received notice that the
Trustee's Sale had in fact occurred.

CIT did not take any action

until April 2005, when it began the process of foreclosing on its
own trust deed on the Property.
current action to, inter

alia,

On July 20, 2005, RJW filed the
enjoin CIT from proceeding with

its foreclosure and for a declaratory judgment stating that RJW
has title in fee simple to the Property free of any adverse
claims from CIT.
On August 31, 2005, RJW filed a motion for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction asking the Court to
enjoin CIT's scheduled foreclosure of the Property.

The Court

granted a temporary restraining order that would remain in effect
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until further order. The Court now has before it R J W s motion for
summary judgement and CIT's cross-motion for summary judgment.

ARGUMENTS
CIT claims that the Trustee's Sale that took place on
December 13, 2004 was invalid because the Cancellation of Default
had been recorded and therefore the statutory requirements for
the sale were not met.

Conversely, RJW claims that CIT is

estopped from arguing the Trustee's Sale was invalid because CIT
had notice the sale was going forward, but did not object or take
any action to stop the sale.
RJW claims in its motion for summary judgment that the
undisputed facts show that CIT had actual notice of the Trustee's
Sale and that it is estopped from objecting to the sale because
CIT consciously chose to remain silent about the alleged
procedural defect of the sale and allowed the sale to go forward.
Alternatively, RJW argues that CIT has waived its right to object
to the procedural defects of the sale.
Falls

Canal

Sec.

Co.

V. American

Savings

RJW relies on American
and Loan Ass'n

for the

proposition that a party who acquiesces in a foreclosure
proceeding may be estopped from objecting to irregularities in
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the proceeding.

Pursuant to American

Falls,

RJW contends that

CIT' s acquiescence in the foreclosure proceeding estops it from
objecting to the validity of the sale.
In further support of its argument, RJW alleges that the
Cancellation of Default was simply a technical irregularity and
that allegations of technical defects are insufficient to set
aside a trustee's sale.

A notice of default is a notice

requirement and if the objective of the notice requirement is
met, then defects in the notice will not affect the validity of
the sale.

The objective of the notice requirement is to inform

persons with an interest in the property of the pending sale.
Because CIT had notice of the sale, this objective was met and
the sale was valid.
RJW also contends that CIT cannot assert protection under
Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-24 because the statute only protects
debtors, not beneficiaries.

Because CIT is not a debtor, it

cannot object to the sale based on noncompliance with § 57-1-24.
CIT filed an opposition to RJW's motion as well as a crossmotion for summary judgment on May 31, 2006. CIT claims that
contrary to RJW's claims, American

Falls

stands for the

proposition that estoppel and waiver may only be used where there
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is sufficient conduct by the party to be estopped.
Falls,

In

American

the Lender relied on extensive and affirmative conduct by

the party that was estopped.

In the current matter, CIT's only

conduct was silence and RJW cannot claim reliance on CIT's
silence because RJW should have easily discovered the
Cancellation of Default by doing an updated title search.
CIT further contends that the Cancellation of Default voided
the trustee's authority to conduct the Trustee's Sale and
therefore estoppel and waiver cannot be used to validate a void
sale.

CIT agrees that every notice defect and sale irregularity

does not make the sale void, but contends that the test for
whether a sale is void is whether the defect or irregularity
would have the effect of chilling the bidding or causing an
inadequacy of the price.

CIT contends that the Cancellation of

Default would have chilled the bidding and resulted in an
inadequate price because the consequence of the Cancellation of
Default was that there was no notice at all.
CIT also reasons that the Cancellation of Default would have
chilled bidding because people would either not attend the sale
or not bid because the quality of title would be uncertain.

For

support, CIT points to the trustee's deposition where the trustee

-8-

000498

admitted that a reasonable conclusion for someone who saw the
Cancellation of Default is that the sale would not be valid.

The

trustee also admitted that the sale may be invalid for those who
did not have actual notice that the sale was moving forward
despite the Cancellation of Default.
CIT also contends that it acted reasonably by not bidding
because if it had bid and won, it risked losing title to the
Property because of the defective notice.

The purpose of the

notice system is to allow parties to rely on the predictability
of the statutory notice process.

If notice is effective even

when the statute is not complied with, then the continuity and
uniformity of the statutory process is harmed.

Therefore, CIT

was entitled to rely on the record at the County Recorder's
office and the deficient notice voided the sale.
RJW filed a reply memorandum to CIT's opposition on June 2,
2006, as well as an opposition memorandum to CIT's cross-motion
on June 9, 2006.

RJW responds that estoppel may not only stem

from a party's actions, but may also stem from a party's
inactions.

Because CIT received actual notice from RJW that the

Trustee's Sale was moving forward and failed to take any action
to stop the sale, CIT is now estopped from contesting the sale.
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RJW further argues that CIT has not met its burden to show
that bidding may have been chilled and that the price was
inadequate.

CIT has not contended that the price was inadequate

nor has it produced evidence that the bidding was chilled.

It is

insufficient to allege that bidding may have been chilled, but
one must show that the bidding was actually chilled.

CIT has

failed to do so.
On June 21, 2006, CIT filed a reply memorandum to RJW f s
opposition memorandum.

CIT argues that by arguing estoppel and

waiver, RJW has conceded that the Trustee's Sale was void.
Because the sale was void, it cannot be validated by the
equitable principles of waiver and estoppel.

Nonjudicial

foreclosures are governed exclusively by statute and if the
statute is not complied with, the trustee has no power to conduct
a sale, even in equity.

Therefore, estoppel and waiver cannot be

used to validate the sale.
CIT also argues that it is not required to show that the
bidding was in fact chilled, but simply that the Cancellation of
Default would have the effect of chilling the bidding.

CIT

distinguishes R J W s cited cases on the basis that all of them
deal with defects in the notice of sale and not with defects in
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the notice of default.

This distinction is important because the

notice of default is what gives the trustee the statutory
authority to conduct the sale. Without a valid notice of default,
the trustee has no authority to conduct a valid sale.

DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits, and other submissions reflect no genuine
issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56©). The purpose

of summary judgment "is to eliminate the time, trouble and
expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as
asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to
prevail."

Holbrook

Co.

v.

Adams,

542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975).

A non-moving party who bares the burden of proof at trial must
produce evidence sufficient to meet each element of their claim
to preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Ford,

94 P.3d 301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 2004).

Sanns

v.

Butterfield

Bare contentions,

unsupported by any specification of facts, are not enough.
Massey

v. Utah

Power

& Light

Co.,

609 P.2d 937 (Utah 1980).

"Ordinarily, the issues of waiver and estoppel involve
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questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact.

Where,

however, the facts and circumstances are admitted or clearly
established and where only one inference may reasonably be drawn
from the evidence . . . waiver and estoppel become questions of
law." Am. Falls

Canal

Sec.

P.2d 412, 415 (Utah 1989).

Co.

v.

Am. Sav.

and Loan Ass'n,

775

The parties do not dispute the

essential facts in this matter and therefore summary judgment is
appropriate.
The issue to be resolved is whether CIT's conduct estops1 it
from objecting to irregularities regarding the notice of default.
"Equitable estoppel requires proof of three elements: (I) a
statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action
or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the basis of
the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act;
and (iii) injury2 to the second party that would result from

1

In addition to estoppel, RJW also argues that CIT waived
its right to object to any irregularities in the Trustee's Sale
and that even if it had not, the statute only protects debtors,
not beneficiaries. Because the Court holds that R J W s estoppel
claim is dispositive, the Court does not address R J W s waiver or
standing claim.
2

CIT does not, at least expressly, dispute that RJW would be
injured if CIT was now allowed to set aside the Trustee's Sale.
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allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such
statement, admission, act, or failure to act." Nunley
Casing

Servs.,

1999 UT 100, i 34, 989 P.2d 1077.

v.

Westates

Utah law is

clear that the principles of estoppel may apply in the context of
nonjudicial foreclosures.
Sav.

and Loan Ass'n,

See Am. Falls

Canal

Sec.

Co.

v.

Am.

775 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1989) ("The

principles of waiver and estoppel have application in determining
the rights of parties to foreclosure sales.); Occidental
Fed.

Sav.

Bank

v.

Mehr,

Neb.

791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

("While such estoppel principles are most often applied in
judicial actions, the facts and circumstances surrounding a
nonjudicial foreclosure make the situations sufficiently
similar.").
CIT first argues that estoppel cannot apply to it because
there was not sufficient conduct on its part.
R J W s primary case, American

Falls,

based on the fact that the

party's affirmative conduct in American Falls
than CIT's silent acquiescence.

CIT distinguishes

was more extensive

Although CIT successfully shows

that its conduct is not as extensive as the affirmative conduct

In any case, RJW would clearly be injured if it was required to
go through the time and expense of another trustee's sale based
on CIT's objection.
-13-
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present in American

Falls,

it fails to show that its conduct was

not sufficient for estoppel to apply.

Estoppel not only applies

to affirmative action such as in American

Falls,

applies where there is failure to take action.

but it also
See

Nunley,

1999

UT at 1 34 (listing failure to act as a way to satisfy the first
element of estoppel); Am. Falls

("A mortgagor by acquiescence
the

proper

time

Canal

Sec.

and failure

Co.,

775 P.2d at 414

to assert

his

rights

at

may well be estopped to set up irregularities in

the foreclosure proceedings to defeat rights of the purchaser.")
(citation omitted)(emphasis added).
It is undisputed that CIT acquiesced in the Trustee's Sale.
CIT does not dispute that it was fully aware that the
Cancellation of Default had been recorded and that it therefore
had grounds to object to the sale.3

CIT assumes that its only

option was to purchase the Property and therefore risk not having
good title.
alternative.

Clearly, however, this was not CIT's only
CIT was free to object to the sale based on the

3

CIT's argument that RJW could have easily discovered the
Cancellation of Default misses the point. The relevant conduct
for whether CIT should be estopped is CIT's conduct, not R J W s
conduct. Regardless of whether RJW should have done an updated
title search, the fact remains that CIT knew about the
Cancellation of Default and chose to allow the Trustee's Sale to
proceed without objection.
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Cancellation of Default and ask the Court to enjoin the Trustee's
Sale from taking place.

Indeed, this is precisely the action RJW

has taken with regard to CIT" s attempted foreclosure.

However,

rather than object or inform the trustee or RJW that it believed
that the proposed sale would be invalid, CIT silently allowed the
Trustee's Sale to take place.

When CIT acquiesced in the sale

with full knowledge of the Cancellation of Default, it gave up
its right to later object after that sale had been completed.
CIT argues that nevertheless the Trustee's Sale must be set
aside because the Cancellation of Default voided the sale.
Although CIT concedes that not every defective notice and
irregularity in a trustee's sale makes the sale void, CIT is also
correct that where noncompliance results in a ''complete legal
nullity," the sale should be set aside.
Notice defects or irregularities that would allow for
setting aside a trustee's sale must be those "that would have the
effect
price."

Concepts,

1 chilling the bidding and causing an inadequacy of
Timm v. Dewsnup,

Inc.

v.

First

1158, 1159 (Utah 1987).

2003 UT 1 , 1 36, 86 P.3d 699 (quoting

Security

Realty

Servs.,

Inc.,

743 P.2d

The reason for this requirement is that

the "statutes regulating nonjudicial sales of property secured by

O U f J i iH

trust deeds are intended to protect the interests of the
trustor/debtor in having the property sold for a fair price."
Thomas

v.

Johnson,

801 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). If

this objective is not met, then the trustee's sale should be set
aside.

Conversely, if this objective has been satisfied, then

"immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency
of the notice or the sale made pursuant thereto."
at f 36.

Timm,

2003 UT

However, the remedy of setting aside a trustee's sale

should only be applied in cases that reach unjust extremes.
Concepts,

743 P.2d at 1159.

CIT has failed to offer any evidence that the statute's
objective was not met or that the Cancellation of Default
resulted in chilled bidding or an inadequate price.4

CIT argues

that it is not required to produce affirmative evidence of
chilled bidding, but the cases indicate otherwise.

See

Concepts,

743 P.2d at 1159 ("Defendant's statement that the incorrect date
had the potential to mislead prospective bidders is insufficient
to conclude that it in fact did."); Occidental/Neb.

Fed.

Sav.

4

The parties dispute whether the requirement to show chilled
bidding or an inadequacy of price is conjunctive or disjunctive.
This Court need not decide this issue since CIT has failed to
provide evidence of either chilled bidding or an inadequate
price.
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Bank,

791 P.2d at 221 ("there was no evidence presented that the

inaccurate description of the property . . . had any chilling
effect on the bidding or resulted in an inadequate b i d . " ) .
Moreover, even if CIT was correct that it does not have to
provide evidence that the bidding was in fact chilled or resulted
in an inadequate price, the Court does not find that the
Cancellation of Default would potentially lead to such a result.
If i!i I ndividual discovered a Cancellation of Default had been
recorded, but also discovered a Notice of Sale indicating that a
tr\ istee' s sa] e was going to be held, :i I: :i s i 1.1 i ] ike 1 y that the
individual would simply assume that the resulting sale would be
inva] :i d and do nothing more.

At a minimum, the :i ndividual would

call the trustee to inquire further as to the discrepancy.

CIT's

argument that there could be a number of individuals who would
have chosen not to bid at the Trustee's Sale because they
believed it was invalid is unconvincing.
CIT also attempts to avoid the reach of Utah cases using
estoppel in nonjudicial foreclosure actions by distinguishing
between a defect in the notice of default and a defect in the
notice of sale.

CIT argues that the Utah cases using estoppel in

nonjudicial foreclosure actions deal with defects in the notice
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of sale, not the notice of default, as is the case here.

Using

this distinction, CIT contends that the equitable principle of
estoppel cannot be used where there is a defect in the notice of
default because the trustee has no power to conduct a sale until
a valid notice of default is given.
CIT's argument is unpersuasive for two reasons.

First,

there is nothing in the plain language of § 57-1-24 that
indicates a defect in the notice of default will void a sale, but
a defect in the notice of sale will not.

In fact, the statute

not only preconditions a trustee's exercise of his power of sale
on getting a notice of default filed, but it also preconditions
the exercise of the power on getting a notice of sale filed as
well.

See

§ 57-1-24(3) ("after the lapse of at least three

months the trustee shall give notice of sale . . . " ) .

If CIT's

reasoning is correct, then a defect in the notice of sale would
also void the sale.

However, this is not the case under Utah law

and CIT has failed to give any persuasive reason why a deficient
notice of default should be treated differently than a deficient
notice of sale for purposes of the validity of the sale.
Secondly, at least one Utah case has involved a deficient
notice of default and the court applied the same standards used
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with a deficient notice of sale.
Savings

Bank,

Federal

In Occident/Nebraska

the Utah Court of Appeals held that an incomplete

description of the property in the notice of default did not void
the sale because the notice of default still provided sufficient
notice and met the objectives of the statute.
21.

791 P.2d at 220-

Therefore, CIT's attempt to find a relevant distinction

between a notice of default and a notice of sale is unsupported
both by the plain language of the statute and Utah case law.
Finally, CIT argues that allowing a valid sale to be based
on a deficient notice of default wi]] create a "shadow notice
system" that will eliminate the predictability and uniformity of
the statutory notice system.

Contrary to CIT's contention, using

the principles of estoppel does not establish a "shadow notice
system" nor does it affect the predictability of the notice
system.

Parties continue to be obligated to comply with the

statutory requirements for nonjudicial foreclosures.

However,

"[t]lle purpose of strict notice requirements in a nonjudicial
sale of property secured by trust deed is to inform persons with
an interest in the property of the pending sale of that property,
so that they may act to protect those interests."
at f 36.

Timm, 2003 UT

Where a party receives notice of the pending sale and
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has an opportunity to protect its interests by objecting to the
sale, but chooses instead to silently allow the sale to take
place, equity will not allow that party to complain about the
known defect after the sale is complete.

This equitable

principle does not affect the predictability of the statutory
process, but simply prevents a party from complaining about a
defective notice when the party had all the notice it needed to
protect its rights.
The Court has examined the rest of CIT's arguments and finds
them to be unpersuasive.

Because CIT acquiesced in the Trustee's

Sale despite having actual notice of the Cancellation of Default
and the opportunity to protect its interests in the property, CIT
is estopped from asserting noncompliance with the statute based
on the Cancellation of Default.

Therefore, for the above reasons, the Court GRANTS RJW's
motion for summary judgment and DENIES CIT's cross-motion for
summary j udgment.

The court believes this goes only to the declaratory and
injunctive relief claims.

Neither party briefed the title claims
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and the court believes the slander of title claim was dismissed
against Southwestern Title but not against CIT.

2.

PLAINTIFF'S

TITLE'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SOUTHWESTERN

CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

BACKGROUND
On January 24, 2001, certain property in Park City (the
"Property") was encumbered by a deed of trust ("IndyMac Trust
Deed") executed in favor of IndyMac Ban), F.S.B.

("IndyMac").

Subsequently, the debtor defaulted on the IndyMac Trust Deed and
IndyMac Bank caused a notice of default (the "Notice of Default")
to be recorded On October 8, 2003.

On July 28, 2004, RJW entered

into an agreement (the "Assignment Agreement") with Deutsche Bank
National Trust Company ("Deutsche Bank") whereby, inter

alia,

the

beneficial interest of the IndyMac Trust Deed was transferred to
RJW.

The Assignment Agreement prohibited Deutsche from pursuing

any collection efforts under the loan and contained an
indemnification provision whereby RJW agreed to hold Deutsche and
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its directors, officers, employees, attorneys and agents harmless
from any claims that arose in connection with the subject of the
transaction.
At the time RJW purchased the IndyMac Trust Deed,
Southwestern Title was the record trustee.

On August 9, 2006,

RJW recorded an Assignment of Trust Deed (the "Assignment Deed")
stating that Deutsche Bank was assigning its beneficial rights
and interest in the IndyMac Trust Deed to RJW. At the top of the
Assignment Deed, the following notation was inscribed:
After recording mail to:
First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.
102 West 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Despite the notation, the parties dispute where the
Assignment Deed was mailed after recording.

Southwestern Title

contends that the deed was sent to RJW's attorneys and offers the
policy and records of the Summit County Recorder as proof.

RJW

relies on the notation as evidence that the Assignment Deed was
sent to Southwestern Title. IndyMac never informed Southwestern
Title about the assignment and RJW did not inform Southwestern
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Title about the assignment until November 16, 2004.
On September 22, 2004, pursuant to instructions from
Deutsche Bank, Southwestern Title recorded a Cancellation of
Notice of Default ("Cancellation of Default"^

The parties

dispute whether Southwestern Title was aware that RJW was the
beneficiary at the time the Cancellation of Default was recorded.
Southwestern Title did not obtain a title update before recording
the Cancellation of Default or inquire as to whether the default
had actually been cured because it was not an industry standard
to do either of these things.
On December 13, 2004, a trustee's sale was held on the
IndyMac Trust Deed.

Several months later, The CIT Group/Consumer

Finance, Inc. ("CIT"), who was a beneficiary on a second trust
deed on the Property, informed RJW that it considered the
trustee's sale invalid because of the Cancellation of Default.
CIT then recorded its own notice of default and RJW filed this
action mi July 20, 2005 to enjoin CIT from foreclosing on the
Property.
In addition to filing suit against CIT, RJW also sued
Southwestern Title for slander of title and breach of duty.
subsequently agreed to the dismissal of its slander of title
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claim. The Court now has before it R J W s motion for summary
judgment and Southwestern Title's cross-motion for summary
judgment.

ARGUMENTS
RJW claims in its motion for summary judgment that as
trustee of the IndyMac Trust Deed, Southwestern Title owed RJW a
duty to act "reasonably and in good faith," and at a minimum,
this included complying with the provisions of the trust deed and
the trust deed statute.

The trust deed statute authorizes a

cancellation of default only if the default is cured and the
trust deed is reinstated.

Because Southwestern Title failed to

ensure that these two conditions were met, it breached its duty
as a matter of law.
Southwestern Title filed an opposition to RJW's motion as
well as a cross-motion for summary judgment on May 25, 2006.
Southwestern Title contends that Utah law treats breach of duty
claims as negligence claims and that summary judgment is
inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its merits except
in the most clear cut cases.

It is not clear cut in this case

because Southwestern Title did not know that RJW had become the
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beneficiary when it followed Deutsche Bank's instructions to
record the Cancellation of Default.
Summary judgment is further inappropriate for RJW because it
is not clear what standard of care should be applied.

Where the

standard of care is in question, summary judgment should not be
granted unless the standard is fixed by law and reasonable minds
could reach but one conclusion as to defendant's liability.
Neither of these conditions are met.
Moreover, summary judgment is inappropriate where, as here,
there n ^ questions as to reasonableness and qood faith.
Southwestern Title acted reasonably and in good faith because it
had no way of knowing thai RJW was the beneficiary nm] it iunl no
statutory or industry obligation to question Deutsche Bank's
instructions or obtain a title search before recording the
Cancellation of Default.
Finally, Southwestern Title contends that summary judgment
is inappropriate because RJW has failed to provide any evidence
that is has been harmed, other than its attorney fees incurred in
this action.

h 1W cannot recover attorney fees because it has no

contractual or statutory right to do so, and further, claims in
negligence for economic loss such as attorney fees are barred by
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the economic loss rule.
Southwestern Title then argues that while summary judgment
is inappropriate for RJW, summary judgment in favor of
Southwestern Title should be granted as a matter of law.
Southwestern Title contends that summary judgment should be
granted because RJW cannot prove the breach of duty element of
its claim.

First, Southwestern Title's primary duty as a trustee

was to ensure payment on the deed of trust and exercise the power
of trustee's sale if the trustor defaults.

RJW contends that the

trustee's sale was valid and therefore, Southwestern Title has
not breached its duty.
Even if the sale was invalid, Southwestern Title acted
reasonably under the circumstances because it was never informed
that Deutsche Bank was no longer the beneficiary.

RJW does not

dispute that Southwestern Title acted in accordance with industry
standards when it did not question Deutsche Bank's instructions
to record the Cancellation of Default and therefore its actions
were reasonable as a matter of law.
Moreover, RJW should have known that a Cancellation of
Default would be filed because the Assignment Agreement between
RJW and Deutsche Bank required Deutsche Bank to cease all
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collection efforts against the debtor.
Southwestern Title contends that summary judgment should
also be granted in its favor because RJW cannot show any harm
that it incurred, other than attorney fees.

Because RJW has no

contractual or statutory right to collect attorney fees and
because attorney fees are barred by the economic loss rule, RJW
cannot prove any damages.

In addition, RJW cannot recover

attorney fees as special damages because special damages are only
available in a slander of title claim and RJW dismissed its
slander of title claim.
Moreover, RJW failed to mitigate its damages and its damages
are a result of its own failure. RJW and its attorneys failed to
obtain an updated title report that would have revealed the
Cancellation of Default and the successor trustee of the IndyMac
Bank Trust Deed admits that it violated industry standards by not
doing so.
Finally, I UJ cannot show harm because it agreed to hold
Deusche Bank and its agents harmless in connection with the
Property.

As an agent of Deutsche Bank, Southwestern Title is

covered by this provision in the Assignment Agreement and
therefore RJW cannot maintain this action against Southwestern
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Title.
RJW filed a reply memorandum on June 7, 2006.

RJW responds

that summary judgment is appropriate because the standard of care
is fixed by the trust deed statute.

The statute requires that a

cancellation of notice of default only be recorded where the
default is cured and the trust deed is reinstated.

This gives a

fixed standard of care that requires a trustee to verify that the
default has been cured.

Southwestern Title breached this duty

and therefore summary judgment is appropriate.
RJW also contends that RJW may recover attorney fees as
special damages because they resulted in a cloud on RJW's title.
The Cancellation of Default was the sole basis on which CIT
claimed that the sale was invalid and Southwestern Title's
actions in filing it were the direct cause of the litigation with
CIT.
RJW filed an opposition memorandum to Southwestern Title's
cross-motion for summary judgment on June 12, 2006.

RJW argues

that summary judgment is inappropriate for Southwestern Title
because a trustee has the statutory duty to ensure that the
underlying default has been cured before the trustee may cancel
the notice of default.

Southwestern Title breached this duty by
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failing to inquire whether the default had been cured.
RJW also disputes that Southwestern Title was an agent of
Deutsche Bank.

To establish an agency relationship, Southwestern

Title must show a fiduciary relationship with Deutsche Bank and
it has failed to do so.

Therefore, Southwestern Title is not

protected by the terms of the Assignment Agreement.
Finally, RJW contends that it did suffer harm from the
Cancellation of Default because it placed a cloud on its title
and therefore it can recover its attorney fees as special
damages.

In addition, both its actions and the successor

trustee's actions were reasonable under the circumstances and
therefore summary ji idgment cannot be granted based on a failure
to mitigate.
Southwestern Title filed a reply memorandum on June 22,
2006.

Southwestern Title contends that there is no issue of

material fact as to whether Southwestern Title breached its duty
because RJW has failed to provide any evidence disputing
Southwestern Title7s expert affidavits that Southwestern Title
acted reasonably :i i: :
n ] i • j \ it : »f :i ndustry standards .

. 1 las also

failed to provide any evidence that Southwestern Title had notice
that RJW was the beneficiary.
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Southwestern Title also contends that it was clearly an
agent for Deutsche Bank and therefore cannot be sued by RJW.
Agency exists where a party acts on behalf of, and under the
control of, a principal.

Southwestern Title acted on behalf of

Deutsche Bank and therefore RJW must hold it harmless under its
Assignment Agreement with Deutsche Bank.
Finally, Southwestern Title argues that RJW cannot prove it
is entitled to special damages because special damages are only
available under a slander of title claim.
failed to mitigate its damages.

In addition, RJW

RJW has failed to submit any

evidence disputing that industry standards require that the
successor trustee update the title at the time he becomes
successor trustee.

The law is clear that a plaintiff has the

duty to mitigate its damages and because RJW failed to do so, he
cannot recover any damages arising from that failure.

DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits, and other submissions reflect no genuine
issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

UTAH

R.

CIV.

P. 56©) .

The purpose
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of summary judgment "is to eliminate the time, trouble and
expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as
asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to
prevail."

Holbrook

Co. v. Adams,

542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975).

A non-moving party who bares the burden of proof at trial must
produce evidence sufficient to meet each element of their claim
to preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Ford,

Sanns

v.

Butterfield

94 P.3d 301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 2004).
I. RJW' s Motion for Summary Judgment
Both parties agree that RJW's breach of duty claim should be

treated as a negligence claim.
Utah,

/•>=;

M

See Wycalis

v. Guardian

Title

of

R?i . B9R m+-av, ct. App. 1989) (stating that the

breach of duty claim by a beneficiary against a trustee amounted
to a negligence claim).

Both parties also agree that summary

judgment should only be granted if the applicable standard of
care is "fixed by law, and reasonable minds could reach but one
conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under the
circumstances.

White

1994) (quoting Wycalis,

v.

Deseelhorst,

879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah

780 P.2d at 825). The parties dispute,

however, whether the standard of care in this case is fixed by
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law.5
u

[T]he applicable standard of care in a given case may be

established, as a matter of law, by legislative enactment or
prior judicial decision."

Wycalis,

780 P.2d at 825.

Neither

party points to any prior judicial decision as establishing the
standard of care, but RJW contends a fixed standard of care is
established by Utah

Code Annotated

§§ 57-1-24 and 57-1-31.

Section 57-1-24 provides that a trustee may not exercise his
power of sale until certain acts such as filing a notice of
default and a notice of sale are completed.
details how an existing default may be cured.

Section 57-1-31(1)
After detailing

how a default may be cured, the provision states that M[a]fter
the beneficiary or beneficiary's successor in interest has been

5

Southwestern Title seemingly argues against itself on the
point. In its opposition memorandum, it contends that there is
no standard of care fixed by law and that in the absence of a
fixed standard of care, it is a question for the fact finder and
therefore summary judgment cannot be granted. However, in its
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment,
Southwestern Title contends that it met its primary duty under
the trust deed statute and therefore its summary judgment motion
should be granted. The implication of this second argument is
that Southwestern Title does in fact believe the standard of care
is fixed and that it met the appropriate standard. Although
Southwestern Title is free to make inconsistent arguments such as
this, the persuasiveness of both arguments are undermined as a
result.
-32-
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paid and the default cured, the obligation and trust deed shall
be reinstated as if no acceleration had occurred."

Subsection

(2) then states that:
[i]f the default is cured and the trust
deed reinstated . . . the trustee shall execute,
acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of the
recorded notice of default under the trustee
deed; and any trustee who refuses to execute and
record this cancellation within 30 days is
liable to the person curing the default for all
actual damages resulting from this refusal.
RJW contends that these provisions require' a trustee to do
more than simply rely on a beneficiary's instructions to record a
notice of cancellation of default, it requires that the trustee
take some action to determine whether the default has actually
been cured.
However, there is nothing in the plain language of § 57-1-31
that indicates what steps, if any, a trustee must take to ensure
that the default has actually been cured.

Although the statute

states that a trustee is liable for refusing to record a notice
of cancellation, the statute notably gives no penalties for a
trustee that records a notice of cancellation where the default
has not been cured. There is simply nothing in the plain language
of the statute showing that the legislature intended to provide a
standard of care that requires a trustee who has received
-33-

instructions from a beneficiary to cancel a notice of default to
take affirmative action to determine if the default has actually
been cured.

Without something more, this Court is unwilling to

find a fixed standard of care based on a statute that says
nothing about a trustee's duty to verify that the default has
been cured.
This conclusion is supported by the decision in Wycalis.
Wycalis,

In

a trustee reconveyed a trust deed to the trustor based

on a forged request for reconveyance.

780 P.2d at 822-23.

The

trustee did not contact the beneficiary to verify her request nor
did it require delivery of the original promissory note or trust
Id.

deed.

at 823.

The beneficiary sued the trustee claiming it

had breached its duty by reconveying her trust deed based on the
forged request.

Id.

One of the issues addressed by the court was whether a
trustee standard of care had been fixed by the trust deed
statute.

Wycalis,

780 P.2d at 825.

The beneficiary argued that

§ 57-1-33 provided a fixed standard of care for a trustee.6
at 826, n.7.

Id.

The beneficiary relied on language in the provision

that stated that "when the obligation secured by any trust deed

6

Section 57-1-33 was repealed in 1994..
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has been satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request by
the beneficiary, reconvey the trust property."

Id.

The

beneficiary contended that because the obligation had not been
satisfied, the trustee breached its duty by reconveying the trust
property based on the forged request.

Id.

The court surmised that the beneficiary was essentially
arguing that the statute subjected trustees to a strict liability
standard.

Wycalis,

780 P.2d at 826, n.7.

The court then noted

that the legislature had gone to great lengths in § 57-1-33 to
define the duties of the beneficiary and the resulting liability
for the breach of those duties, but failed to address any duties
or resulting liabilities for a trustee who reconveyed property
before the obligation was satisfied.

Id.

The court further

stated that the language regarding the trustee was likely
intended only as a procedural guide for trustees.

Id.

In light

of these facts, the court concluded that it was unwilling to find
a strict liability standard of care for trustees where the
legislature did not expressly provide for one.

Id.

Because the

court found no fixed standard of care provided by a legislative
enactment or prior judicial opinion, the court held that summary
judgment was inappropriate and that the standard of care should
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be determined through fact finding.

Id.

The beneficiary's argument in Wycalis

and R J W s argument are

closely related and the reasoning applied to the statutory
provision in Wycalis

applies to the statutory provisions at issue

As with the beneficiary in Wycalis,

here.

RJW wishes to find a

fixed standard of care in a statutory provision that does not
expressly purport to establish one.
Wycalis,

As with the court in

this Court declines to find a fixed standard of care

where there is insufficient evidence that a legislature intended
to provide one.

Because RJW has not offered any other evidence

besides the statute for finding a fixed standard of care that
would favor RJW,

RJW's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

II. Southwestern Title's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
The next issue before the Court is Southwestern Title's
cross-motion for summary judgment.

As discussed above, in the

absence of a standard of care fixed by prior judicial opinion or
legislative enactment, the standard of care is normally a factual
i
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question that makes summary judgment inappropriate.
Wycalis,

Indeed, in

the Utah Court of Appeals found there was no fixed

standard of care for a trustee's duty in relation to a request
for reconveyance and therefore reversed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment and remanded the matter for the fact finder
to determine the appropriate standard of care.
The result from Wycalis

would seem to compel the conclusion

that Southwestern Title's cross-motion should also be denied
since there is no fixed standard of care by prior judicial
opinion or legislative enactment.

However, there is one critical

difference in this matter that distinguishes it from
Unlike Wycalisf

Wycalis.

there is undisputed evidence of the industry

standard of care in this case.
In Wycalis,

the court stated that the standard of care

should be established factually, with an emphasis on standard-ofcare-in-the-industry evidence.

780 P.2d at 826.

The court also

indicated that expert testimony would be particularly helpful in
delineating the appropriate standard of care.
Moreover, the Wycalis
"conducive to an

y

as

Id.

at 826, n.8.

court stated that the matter was not
a matter of law' determination,

in the absence of uncontroverted

especially

standard-of'-the-industry
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evidence."

Id.

at 825 (emphasis added).

Wycalis

therefore left

the door open for the possibility that summary judgment may be
appropriate where a case involved "uncontroverted standard-ofthe-industry evidence."
It appears that such uncontroverted evidence is present in
this case.

In Southwestern Title's statement of undisputed

material facts, 1 15 states that "[Southwestern Title] did not
obtain a title report before recording the [Cancellation of
Default] because it is not an industry standard to do so."

RJW

wrote in response to this paragraph in its opposition memorandum,
"Undisputed."
Paragraph 16 of Southwestern Title's statement of undisputed
material facts further states that "[i]t is not the custom or
practice for a trustee to obtain a title report before recording
a Cancellation of Notice of Default or to question the authority
of the purported beneficiary."

In response to this statement of

fact, RJW responded "Disputed, insofar as the Trust Deed Statute
imposes a clear duty upon a trustee to ensure that the debt
underlying a trust deed has been paid and the default cured prior
to a trustee's issuance of a cancellation of notice of default"
(emphasis added).

A plain reading of this response indicates
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that RJW disputed the statement only to the extent that the trust
deed statute imposes a duty to ensure the default has been cured.
RJW apparently does not dispute that the custom or practice is
not to question the authority of the purported beneficiary, but
simply that the trust deed statute overrides the industry custom.
As has already been discussed, RJW's argument that the trust
deed statute provides such a duty has been rejected.

Therefore,

if it is true that RJW does not dispute that the industry trade
or custom is not to obtain a title report when recording a notice
of cancellation of default or question a purported beneficiary's
authority to request such a recording, then there is no reason to
send the matter to the fact finder to determine the industry
trade or custom.
Even if RJW does dispute that this is the industry trade or
custom, RJW has offered no evidence to support this dispute.

On

the other hand, Southwestern Title has offered evidence to
support its claim for what is the industry custom or practice.
Southwestern Title provided an affidavit from Melven E. Smith
("Mr. Smith77) , the owner of Westland Title Insurance Agency.

Mr.

Smith states in his affidavit that he has "personally acted as a
trustee in the foreclosure of thousands of Deeds of Trust" and
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that it is not the practice in the industry to "question the
instruction from the lender to cancel a Notice of Default" nor
"is it the practice in the industry for a trustee to search title
before recording" such a document.

Southwestern Title also

offers an affidavit from Kathy A. Davis ("Ms. Davis"), the
manager of the foreclosure department for First American Title
Insurance Agency.

Ms. Davis states that in her experience,

trustees follow instructions from the beneficiary to cancel a
notice of default and that it is not First American's standard
practice to search title before recording the cancellation
notice.
Southwestern Title's evidence as to the industry practice
regarding the filing of a notice of cancellation of default
places the burden on RJW to provide evidence to the contrary if
it wishes to dispute the alleged industry practice.
however, has failed to provide any such evidence.

RJW,
Because RJW

seemingly does not dispute the industry practice is to accept
instructions from a beneficiary to cancel a notice of default
without making any further investigation, there is no need for
the fact finder to determine the standard of care on this matter
and it may properly be decided as a matter of law.
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However, despite the undisputed evidence of the appropriate
standard of care for a trustee recording a cancellation notice,
if Southwestern Title had actual7 notice that Deutsche Bank was
no longer the beneficiary, then summary judgment would be
inappropriate.
RJW's sole evidence that Southwestern Title had notice that
RJW was the beneficiary is that the Assignment Deed stated that
after it had been recorded, it should be sent to Southwestern
Title.8

To dispute that it was sent to Southwestern Title,

Southwestern Title offers correspondence from the Summit County
Recorder stating that it is the policy of Summit County to return
the original recorded document to the party that requested the
recording, even if the face of the document expressly instructs

7

Although the recording of the Assignment Deed clearly
allowed Southwestern Title the opportunity to discover that
Deutsche Bank was no longer the beneficiary, as discussed above,
the industry standard of care does not require a trustee to do an
updated title search before recording a cancellation of default
and therefore the fact that the Assignment Deed was recorded
cannot be used to show Southwestern Title breached its duty.
8

RJW also states that it never received the recorded
Assignment Deed, but it does not offer any evidence to support
this claim. Moreover, Southwestern Title's evidence shows that
Wrona & Parrish received it, not that RJW received it. Therefore
RJW's unsupported contention that it never received the
Assignment Deed is inapposite.
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that the document be sent to another party.

Southwestern Title

also points to records from the Summit County Recorder's office
that indicates that the Assignment Deed was to be sent to Wrona &
Parrish PC and lists Wrona & Parrish PC's address.

Finally,

Southwestern Title offers deposition testimony that Southwestern
Title never received the recorded document.
The Court finds that in light of Summit County's stated
policy of sending the recorded document back to the original
party even where the document says to do otherwise,9 the Summit
County records showing that the document was to be sent to Wrona
& Parrish PC, and deposition testimony that Southwestern Title
did not receive the Assignment Deed, the only reasonable
inference is that Southwestern Title did not receive the
Assignment Deed.

Because the Assignment Deed is the only

evidence that RJW offers to show Southwestern Title knew that
Deutsche Bank was no longer the beneficiary, the Court finds that
RJW has failed to create an issue of fact on whether Southwestern
Title had notice.

Since Southwestern Title did not have notice

9

Summit County will send a recorded document to an
alternative party if there was a self-addressed stamped envelope
to the alternative party, but RJW has not alleged that this was
the case.
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that Deutsche Bank was no longer the beneficiary and the industry
standard of care did not require Southwestern Title to question
Deutsche Bank's instructions or do an updated title search,
Southwestern Title did not breach its duty as a trustee as a
matter of law.10

Therefore, for the above reasons, Southwestern Title's
cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

3. SOUTHWESTERN

TITLE'S

MOTION FOR ALLOCATION

OF

FEES/

BACKGROUND
On February 28, 2006, RJW responded to Southwestern Title's
Request for Admission No. 2 and admitted that the original
Assignment of Trust Deed recorded July 28, 2004 was returned to
Wrona & Parrish and not Southwestern Title.

Southwestern Title

thereafter deposed S. Blake Parrish ("Mr. Parrish")f an attorney
and trustee who worked at Wrona & Parrish.

Southwestern Title

Because the Court finds that Southwestern Title did not
breach its duty as a matter of law, the Court does not address
Southwestern Title's other arguments for summary judgment.
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did not ask Mr. Parrish certain questions regarding the receipt
of the Assignment of Trust Deed because the matter had been
admitted.
Subsequently, RJW filed a motion to withdraw its admission
that Wrona & Parrish had received the Assignment of Trust Deed.
After full briefing and oral argument, this Court granted R J W s
motion to withdraw its admission and allowed the parties to do
additional discovery in light of the Court's decision, but stated
that "[t]he court will not foreclose a request by [Southwestern
Title] for allocation of cost and fees associated with this
additional discovery required."
Following this Court's decision, Southwestern Title served a
Second Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of
Documents and Requests for Admissions ("Additional Discovery
Request").

Southwestern Title now brings this motion to allocate

the fees and costs incurred in drafting and serving its
Additional Discovery Request and in bringing the current motion.

ARGUMENTS
Southwestern Title claims that it is entitled to its costs
and fees incurred in drafting and serving its Additional
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Discovery Request and its current motion because if RJW had not
admitted it received the Assignment of Trust Deed and then
withdrawn its admission, Southwestern Title would not have
incurred these costs.
August 4, 2006.

RJW filed an opposition memorandum on

RJW claims that Southwestern Title is not

entitled to its costs and fees because RJW and Mr. Parrish saved
time by voluntarily gathering and delivering additional documents
to Southwestern Title in response to Southwestern Title's
discovery requests.

RJW also claims that Southwestern Title's

Additional Discovery Request is "standard litigation fare and the
very kinds of questions that chew up hours of deposition time."
Southwestern Title filed a reply memorandum on August 11, 2006
and disputed that RJW 7 s manner of discovery saved any time or
resources.

DISCUSSION
RJW essentially makes two arguments for why Southwestern
Title should not receive its costs and fees incurred in its
Additional Discovery Request and in bringing its motion.

RJW

first argues that Southwestern Title's motion has no relation to
conducting the additional discovery.
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RJW secondly argues that

RJW and Mr. Parrish 'Voluntarily collected and delivered
[additional responsive documents] to various discovery requests
from [Southwestern Title]" and because Southwestern Title's
Additional Discovery Request would have taken up hours of
deposition time, Southwestern Title did not have to expend any
extra time or resources.11
Neither of these arguments, however, justify denying
Southwestern Title's motion for costs and fees.

Without RJW's

mistaken admission, Southwestern Title would not have had to
serve its Additional Discovery Request or bring this motion.
Although RJW contends that the manner in which discovery
proceeded actually saved time, it offers no evidence12 or
persuasive argument that time was actually saved.

This Court

finds that Southwestern Title should not have to pay for RJW's
pleading mistake.
11

RJW also contends that Mr. Parrish offered to collect
documents for Southwestern Title's review, but Southwestern Title
declined the offer. The Court finds this fact irrelevant since
Southwestern Title was still relying on RJW's mistaken admission
at the time it declined Mr. Parrish's offer.
12

Indeed, while RJW contends that XAa review of [Southwestern
Title's] supplemental discovery requests reveals that those
requests are standard litigation fare and the very kinds of
questions that chew up hours of deposition time," RJW does not
attach a copy of the discovery requests or give any indication as
to the content of the questions.
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Therefore, for the above reasons, Southwestern Title's
Motion for Allocation of Fees is GRANTED.

The court finds that the amount of $537.50 for the costs and
fees incurred in the Additional Discovery Request and in bringing
the current motion is reasonable.

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the Court and no other
order is required.

DATED this

Ly

day of September, 2006,
BY TSE^COUST:

i/

BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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